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Abstract
Prior to the global financial crisis, financial innovation was viewed very positively, resulting
in a laissez-faire, deregulatory approach to financial regulation. Since the crisis the regulatory
pendulum has swung to the other extreme. Post-crisis regulation, plus rapid technological change,
have spurred the development of financial technology (FinTech). FinTech firms and data-driven
financial service providers profoundly challenge the current regulatory paradigm. Financial reg-
ulators increasingly seek to balance the traditional regulatory objectives of financial stability and
consumer protection with promoting growth and innovation. The resulting regulatory innova-
tions include RegTech, regulatory sandboxes, and special charters. This Article analyzes possible
new regulatory approaches, ranging from doing nothing (which spans being permissive to highly
restrictive, depending on context), cautious permissiveness (on a case-by-case basis, or through
special charters), structured experimentalism (such as sandboxes or piloting), and development of
specific new regulatory frameworks. Building on this framework, we argue for a new regulatory
approach, which incorporates these rebalanced objectives, and which we term ‘smart regulation.’
Our new automated and proportionate regime builds on shared principles from a range of jurisdic-
tions and supports innovation in financial markets. The fragmentation of market participants and
the increased use of technology requires regulators to adopt a sequential reform process, starting
with digitization, before building digitally-smart regulation. This Article provides a roadmap for
this process.
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special charters. This Article analyzes possible new regulatory
approaches, ranging from doing nothing (which spans being
permissive to highly restrictive, depending on context), cautious
permissiveness (on a case-by-case basis, or through special charters),
structured experimentalism (such as sandboxes or piloting), and
development of specific new regulatory frameworks. Building on this
framework, we argue for a new regulatory approach, which
incorporates these rebalanced objectives, and which we term ‘smart
regulation.’ Our new automated and proportionate regime builds on
shared principles from a range of jurisdictions and supports innovation
in financial markets. The fragmentation of market participants and the
increased use of technology requires regulators to adopt a sequential
reform process, starting with digitization, before building digitally-
smart regulation. This Article provides a roadmap for this process.
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INTRODUCTION
Technology is transforming finance around the world at an
unprecedented rate, generating new opportunities and new risks.
Financial regulators must develop new approaches to regulation,
including the use of technology, to balance the benefits of innovation and
economic development with the need for financial stability and consumer
protection.
Prior to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (the Crisis), financial
innovation was generally viewed very positively. This led to laissez-faire,
deregulatory approaches to regulation particularly in global institutional
markets. Post-Crisis financial regulatory reforms have seen a reversal of
this approach with the regulatory pendulum arguably swinging to the
other extreme. 1 Post-Crisis regulatory changes combined with
increasingly rapid technological change have spurred the development of
financial technology (FinTech). 2 FinTech embraces new startups
(FinTechs), established technological and e-commerce companies (which
we call TechFins) 3 as well as incumbent financial firms. FinTech
promises innovation and economic growth through disruption of
traditional finance, yet it also poses a major challenge to the post-Crisis
regulatory paradigm.
In the past two years, financial regulators have started to seek to
balance the traditional regulatory objectives of financial stability and
consumer protection—the focus of post-Crisis regulatory changes—with
the objectives of promoting growth and innovation. The result has been a
process of regulatory innovation including technology (RegTech)4 and
1. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
1019, 1029 (2012).
2. See Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis
Paradigm?, 47 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 1271, 1272–73 (2016); Chris Brummer, Disruptive
Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1037 (2015); Iris H-Y
Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products, Intermediation and
Markets—Policy Implications for Financial Regulators, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL. 55, 56
(2016); Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175,
185–86 (2014).
3. Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., From FinTech to TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges
of Data-Driven Finance, N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. (forthcoming 2017–2018).
4. Douglas W. Arner et al., FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of
Financial Regulation, 37 Nw. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 371 (2017); Lawrence G. Baxter,
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changes to existing frameworks such as the establishment of regulatory
sandboxes.
By analyzing possible regulatory approaches to FinTech innovation,
this Article seeks to redirect the ongoing global discussion on how to
properly regulate FinTech, 5 and whether regulatory sandboxes are
desirable.6 We see four approaches and frame these as doing nothing
(which could be a restrictive or a permissive approach, depending on
context), cautious permissiveness through flexibility and forbearance
(under which existing rules are relaxed in specific contexts), restricted
experimentation (for example sandboxes or piloting), and regulatory
development (in which new regulations are developed to cover new
activities and entrants).
The Article proceeds, in Part I, to undertake a comparative study of
these four possible approaches. Part II considers the traditional regulatory
Adaptive Financial Regulation and RegTech: A Concept Article on Realistic Protection
for Victims of Bank Failures, 66 DUKE L.J. 567, 598 (2016).
5. See generally Cortez, supra note 2; Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How
to Regulate Disruptive Innovation—From Facts to Data, 57 JURIMETRICS (forthcoming
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808044 [https://perma.cc/B5LF-AVZF].
6. For the United States, see Stan Higgins, SEC Petition Calls for Blockchain Token
Rules, COINDESK (May 16, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/sec-petition-calls-for-
blockchain-token-rules/ [https://perma.cc/7M3W-9U7K] (formally petitioning the SEC
to adopt rules for FinTech, including a regulatory sandbox); Richard B. Levin, Should
the SEC Allow FinTech Firms to Play in a Sandbox?, POLSINELLI (Mar. 2017),
http://sftp.polsinelli.com/publications/fintech/resources/upd0317-1fin.pdf [https://perma
.cc/GXL8-J4CJ] (promoting a regulatory sandbox for the United States); Michael S.
Piwowar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Financial Technology
Forum (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/piwowar-statement-
financial-technology-forum-111416.html [https://perma.cc/PEA7-LSRK] (encouraging
the consideration of international approaches to regulate FinTech including the regulatory
sandbox). For the European Union, see Discussion Paper on the EBA’s Approach to
Financial Technology (FinTech), EUR. BANKING AUTHORITY (Aug. 4, 2017),
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1919160/EBA+Discussion+Paper+on+Fi
ntech+%28EBA-DP-2017-02%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPC3-J743] (inquiring into how
to regulate FinTech); Consultation Document, FinTech: A More Competitive and
Innovative European Financial Sector, EUR. COMMISSION (Mar. 25, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-fintech-consultation-document_en_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8JWC-W6G9] (inquiring into how to regulate FinTech). On the
position of the European Banking Industry, see EUROPEAN BANKING FED’N, INNOVATE.
COLLABORATE. DEPLOY. (NOV. 14, 2016) (petitioning for the set-up of a regulatory
sandbox).
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approaches of regulating or not regulating. Part III considers case-by-case
approaches, Part IV addresses the new trend of regulatory sandboxes, and
Part V looks beyond sandboxes to other forms of structured
experimentalism. From this basis, Part VI then suggests possible elements
of a new and better approach that transcends these boxed ways of
thinking—a comprehensive review of existing regulatory approaches in
light of today’s rebalanced objectives that we term “smart regulation.”
I. ANOVERVIEW OF THECURRENT FRAMEWORK
A. POST-CRISISBLUES
The Crisis challenged the dominant positive attitude towards
innovation in finance. Yet innovation matters deeply, and regulators need
to perform a balancing act between preserving stability, protecting
consumers, and promoting innovation. On the one hand, innovation can
enhance market efficiency by reducing transaction and financial
intermediation costs.7 In particular, innovation can provide new solutions
to old problems, including financial exclusion, the quality of consumer
decision-making,8 agency costs, and compliance costs.9
On the other hand, financial innovation can bring new risks, as was
seen with derivatives and securitization which, due to their risk-shifting
characteristics, are indispensable to sophisticated risk transfer and
financial management, yet played a major role in facilitating the Crisis.10
In particular, financial innovation (e.g. certain forms of securitization,
such as collateralized debt obligations, and credit derivatives such as
7. See Arner et al., supra note 2.
8. On robo-advisory, cf. Marika Salo & Helena Haapio, Robo-Advisors and
Investors: Enhancing Human-Robot Interaction Through Information Design, in TRENDS
AND COMMUNITIES OF LEGAL INFORMATICS. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL INFORMATICS SYMPOSIUM IRIS 2017. 441 (Erich Schweighofer et al. eds., 2017).
9. See Arner et al., supra note 2, at 1315–16.
10. See ROSS P. BUCKLEY & DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM ANDREGULATORY FAILURE (2011).
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credit default swaps11) and deregulation12 were significant contributors to
the Crisis. While the risks of innovation were known prior to the Crisis,
pre-Crisis research suggested that the benefits of innovation outweighed
the costs of periodic crises over time.13 Since 2008—as illustrated by Paul
Volcker who commented that he “found very little evidence that vast
amounts of innovation in financial markets in recent years has had a
visible effect on the productivity of the economy”14—this view has been
subject to question.15
Among the main financial regulatory mandates, two were of key
importance as the 2008 Crisis unfolded: first, consumer protection
(particularly of retail clients, investors, and depositors);16 and second,
financial stability more generally, particularly in the macroprudential
context.17 While the microprudential dimension of regulation focuses on
individual institutions, the systemic ormacroprudential perspective looks
at the impact of counterparty interrelationships and/or systemically
11. See Warren Buffett’s statement on credit default swaps as “financial weapons of
mass destruction.” René M. Stulz, Financial Derivatives: Lessons from the Subprime
Crisis, MILKEN INST. REV., First Quarter 2009, at 58, 59 (arguing that financial
derivatives have not caused the housing bubble to burst). The academic discussion is
more nuanced. Id.
12. See Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis,
1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 37 (2011) (arguing that the removal of century-old restraints on
speculative trading via over-the-counter derivatives by the Commodities Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) was the root of the crisis).
13. See DOUGLASW. ARNER, FINANCIAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND THE
ROLE OF THE LAW (2007).
14. ‘The Only Thing Useful Banks Have Invented in 20 Years is the ATM’, N.Y. POST
(Dec. 13, 2009, 6:27 AM), http://nypost.com/2009/12/13/the-only-thing-useful-banks-
have-invented-in-20-years-is-the-atm/ [https://perma.cc/K8SP-DGQE].
15. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 1; James Crotty, Structural Causes of the
Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture’ (Univ. of
Mass. Amherst Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper 2008–14, 2008).
16. Sumit Agarwal et al., Predatory Lending and the Subprime Crisis, 113 J. FIN.
ECON. 29, 31 (2014).
17. ARNER, supra note 13; Dirk Zetzsche, Investment Law as Financial Law: From
Fund Governance over Market Governance to Stakeholder Governance?, in THE
EUROPEAN FINANCIALMARKET IN TRANSITION 339, 343 (Hanne S. Birkmose et al. eds.,
2011).
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important financial institutions (SIFIs).18 In the wake of the Crisis, there
has been a major process of reregulation, designed in particular to address
what are now understood as pre-Crisis weaknesses in regulation.
B. THECHALLENGE OF FINTECH
It is against this backdrop of post-Crisis regulatory change that
FinTech emerged. Technology and finance have had a long relationship
dating, with a particularly close connection over the past 150 years, with
each responding to developments in the other over an extended
evolutionary process.19 In the last ten years, however, the pace of change
in both finance and technology has moved more rapidly than ever before,
resulting in the emergence of a new term and era: FinTech.20
This new era of FinTech is marked by the speed of technological
change and the range of new entrants in the financial sector, including
FinTech startups as well as information technology and e-commerce
TechFins21 all competing with traditional financial institutions and across
developing, emerging, and developed markets.22 In this context, there are
new opportunities for innovation and growth and new challenges,
particularly for regulation and regulators. Lately, the particular challenge
for regulators has been the need to encourage and support disruptive
innovation in order to enhance financial inclusion and support economic
growth.
C. INSTITUTIONALIZEDKNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE THROUGH INNOVATION
HUBS
Extensive interaction between regulators and market participants
provides the necessary background for cautious experimentation with,
and regulation of, innovation.23 Starting in 2015 (to our knowledge, with
18. Iman Anabtawai & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTREDAMEL.REV. 1349, 1403 (2011); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).
19. See Arner et al., supra note 2.
20. Id. at 1286.
21. TechFins are data-rich firms entering financial services businesses, and include
Amazon, Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Tencent. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 3
(manuscript at 4–5).
22. See id. (manuscript at 7, 9).
23. See Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 5.
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the Luxembourg Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier
(CSSF), the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (U.K. FCA),
and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)
functioning as first movers), communication between regulators and
FinTechs has increasingly been institutionalized through the development
of innovation departments within regulatory agencies.
Since 2015, institutional access points have been established in over
twenty jurisdictions:
 Australia: The innovation hub launched in 2015 assists FinTech
start-ups in navigating the Australian regulatory system:
“[E]ligible businesses can request informal guidance from ASIC
on the licensing process and key regulatory issues.”24
 Brunei Darussalam: The Autoriti Monetari Brunei Daarussalam
(AMBD) established a FinTech unit in 2017.25
 Canada: The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) was the first
of the Canadian securities regulators to introduce an innovation
support unit, the OSC LaunchPad, aiming to both support
innovative firms and learn from them.26
 China: Regular outreach with the FinTech sector “is aided by the
National Internet Finance Association (NIFA), which guides and
supervises the implementation of national policies.”27
 Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Money Authority (HKMA) and
Hong Kong Applied Science and Technology Research Institute
(ASTRI) Fintech Innovation Hub holds “dialogues between the
industry and the HKMA on emerging technologies,” and tests
solutions that may be adopted by the HKMA. 28 Further, the
24. Information Hub, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMMISSION, http://asic.gov.au/for-
business/your-business/innovation-hub/ [https://perma.cc/5YW6-ZZL5] (last visited
Oct. 13, 2017).
25. See About the FinTech Office, AUTORITI MONETARI BRUNEI DARUSSALAM,
http://www.ambd.gov.bn/fintech-office [https://perma.cc/QEG6-P9KH] (last visited
Oct. 13, 2017).
26. See OSC Launchpad: Our Approach, ONT. SEC. COMMISSION,
https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/our-approach.htm [https://perma.cc/6846-D9VX] (last
visited Oct. 13, 2017).
27. See FIN. STABILITY BD., FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FINTECH:
SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY ISSUES THAT MERIT AUTHORITIES’ ATTENTION 58
(2017).
28. Letter from Howard Lee, Senior Exec. Dir., H.K. Monetary Auth., to Chief
Exec., All Stored Value Facility (SVF) Licensees (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.hkma.
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HKMA FinTech Facilitation Office, started in March 2016,
functions as a platform for “exchanging ideas among key
stakeholders and conducting outreach[].”29 Similar contact points
have been established in the Hong Kong Securities and Futures
Commission and the Hong Kong Insurance Authority.
 Indonesia: The Bank Indonesia established a dedicated FinTech
Office in November 2016 that functions as an innovation hub.30
 Luxembourg: CSSF has a special department for financial
innovation, established in early 2015, which functions as CSSF’s
innovation hub.31
 Germany: Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufischt
(BaFin) offers close contact and advice to FinTech start-ups.32
 Japan: The Japanese Financial Services Agency launched a
FinTech Support Desk in December 2015.33
 France: In June 2016, the Banque de France and French financial
services regulator Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de
Résolution (ACPR) “created the ACPR Pole Fintech Innovation,
and the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) launched the
Fintech, Innovation et Compétitivité to assist [FinTech]
gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-functions/finanical-infrastructure/20160906e1-svf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/93AY-FDEY].
29. See FinTech Facilitation Office, H.K. MONETARYAUTHORITY, http://www.hkm
a.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-financial-centre/fintech-facilitation-office-
ffo.shtml [https://perma.cc/LRU8-TXVD] (last revised Sept. 29, 2017).
30. See BI Launches Fintech Office, Eyes Teamwork with Industry Players, JAKARTA
POST (Nov. 14, 2016, 2:13 PM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/11/14/bi-
launches-fintech-office-eyes-teamwork-with-industry-players.html
[https://perma.cc/48U5-T34X].
31. See General Organisation, COMMISSION DE SURVEILLANCE DU SECTEUR
FINANCIER, http://www.cssf.lu/en/about-the-cssf/general-organisation/ [https://perma.cc/
NB38-8LNH] (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
32. Fintechs: Adressatengerechte Kommunikation – Umgang der BaFin mit
innovativen Unternehmen, BUNDESANSTALT FÜR FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSAUFISCHT
(Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Fachartikel
/2016/fa_bj_1609_fintechs.html [https://perma.cc/9X5D-AU66].
33. See Japan FSA Launches FinTech Support Desk for Consultation and Exchange
of Information, JFTODAY (Dec. 15, 2015), http://jftoday.com/Japan+FSA+launches+Fin
Tech+Support+Desk+for+consultation+and+exchange+of+information/
[https://perma.cc/PUT3-4V9M]; see also FinTechサポートデスクについて, FIN. SERVS.
AGENCY (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/27/sonota/20151214-2.html
[https://perma.cc/H357-7NWY].
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entrepreneurs in regulatory issues.”34 ACPR and AMF together
have established a FinTech forum.35
 Malaysia: Bank Negara established the Financial Technology
Enabler Group in June 2016.36
 The Netherlands: The Authority for the Financial Markets
(AFM) and the De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) have been
working with an innovation hub where both established entities
and tech start-ups can ask questions.37
 Singapore: The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)
established a financial technology and innovation group with an
innovation lab known as “Looking Glass @ MAS” as well as a
FinTech Office.38
 Switzerland: The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority
(FINMA) established a FinTech desk in 2016.39
 South Korea: The Government established a FinTech Center in
2015.40
34. Therese Torris, French Finance Regulators Embrace Fintech, CROWDFUND
INSIDER (Feb. 1, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/02/95508-
french-finance-regulators-embrace-fintech/ [https://perma.cc/3LCN-EKGW].
35. The AMF and ACPR Launch the FinTech Forum, AUTORITÉ DES MARCHÉS
FINANCIERS (July 19, 2016), http://www.amf-france.org/en_US/Actualites/Communique
s-de-presse/AMF/annee-2016.html?docId=workspace%3A%2F%2FSpacesStore%2Ffef
66ab3-71de-4e2b-b707-d0ca87df1509 [https://perma.cc/WM6T-ATC4].
36. See Financial Technology Enabler Group, BANK NEGARA MALAY.,
http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=idx_b&pg=idx_hghts&ac=46 [https://perma.cc/
SE7H-4KSK] (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
37. AFM & DNB InnovationHub, AFM, https://www.afm.nl/en/professionals/onder
werpen/innovation-hub [https://perma.cc/LS84-ZUW6] (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
38. See FinTech Regulatory Sandbox, MONETARY AUTHORITY SING.,
http://www.mas.gov.sg/Singapore-Financial-Centre/Smart-Financial-Centre/FinTech-
Regulatory-Sandbox.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z348-LCK6] (last modified Jan. 9, 2017);
New FinTech Office: A One-Stop Platform to Promote Singapore as a FinTech Hub,
MONETARY AUTHORITY SING. (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-
Publications/Media-Releases/2016/New-FinTech-Office.aspx [https://perma.cc/EQT9-
SVQ2]; MAS Establishes FinTech Innovation Lab, MONETARYAUTHORITY SING. (Aug.
24, 2016), http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/2016/MAS-
establishes-FinTech-Innovation-Lab.aspx [https://perma.cc/GQQ2-R7FA].
39. FINMA, ANNUALREPORT 2016 24 (Dec. 2016).
40. See Press Release, N. Kor., Plan to Support Convergence of Finance and
Technology (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Press-
Releases/view?articleId=3022 [https://perma.cc/ENL3-JZ48].
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 Taiwan: The Financial Supervisory Commission established a
FinTech office in 2015 and implemented a FinTech Pilot
Program.41
 Thailand: Bank of Thailand has set up a FinTech clinic.42
 Sweden: Established a National Innovation Council “to provide
support and advice to established and startup businesses alike on
issues such as regulatory and permit requirements.”43
 United Kingdom: Project Innovate included the establishment of
an innovation hub in 2015.44
 United States: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s
Office of Innovation serves as a central point of contact, facilitates
responses to inquiries and requests, conducts outreach, and
provides technical assistance. It will “[m]onitor the evolving
financial services landscape” and “[c]ollaborate with domestic
and international regulators.” 45 Similar activities have been
41. Taiwan intends to establish the Financial Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (FISAC) by 2017. The FSC Puts Forward the Financial Technology Development
Promotion Plan, FIN. SUPERVISORY COMMISSION CHINA (TAIWAN) (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.fsc.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?id=74&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=multimessa
ge_view.jsp&dataserno=201611290001&aplistdn=ou=bulletin,ou=multisite,ou=english
,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtable=Bulletin [https://perma.cc/72LN-F9U6]; Financial
Industry Works with the Technology Industry on Fintech Upgrade, FIN. SUPERVISORY
COMMISSION CHINA (TAIWAN) (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.fsc.gov.tw/en/home.
jsp?id=74&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=multimessage_view.jsp&dataserno=2016101
70001&aplistdn=ou=bulletin,ou=multisite,ou=english,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtable=
Bulletin [https://perma.cc/J5FG-RQ2J].
42. See Pawee Sirimai, Four Fintech Firms Apply for Sandbox, BANGKOK POST
(May 9, 2017), https://www.pressreader.com/thailand/bangkok-post/20170509/2819474
27763135 [https://perma.cc/W5B5-55Q3].
43. James Pearse, The Swedish Financial Regulator Is Taking Giant Steps to Support
Innovation, STOCKHOLM FINTECH HUB (May 23, 2017), https://stockholmfin.tech/blog/
the-swedish-financial-regulator-is-taking-giant-steps-to-support-innovation/
[https://perma.cc/3922-HDC3].
44. See ERNST & YOUNG LLP, UK FINTECH: ON THE CUTTING EDGE: AN
EVALUATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINTECH SECTOR 51 (2016), https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/502995/UK_FinTech_-_On_
the_cutting_edge_-_Full_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7TB-QU7B].
45. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
DECISIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING A RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION FRAMEWORK 4 (Oct. 2016),
https://occ.gov/topics/bank-operations/innovation/comments/recommendations-decision
2017] REGULATING A REVOLUTION: FROM 43
REGULATORY SANDBOXES TO SMART REGULATION
initiated by the United States Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) through the LabCFTC.46
These contact points and innovation support functions highlight the
wide of regulators around the world driven to new approaches by
FinTech.
D. THEREGULATORY PENDULUM SWINGSBACK: OLD ANDNEW
APPROACHES TO FINTECH INNOVATION
While one principal effect of the Crisis was a very cautious
regulatory approach to innovation, the rapid evolution of FinTech in the
past decade, increasing policy pressure to re-start economic growth (e.g.
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act47 in the United States),
and an international agenda to foster financial inclusion,48 have combined
to bring pressure to bear on regulators to support innovation, particularly
digital disruption. This requires regulators to balance support for
innovation with their core regulatory mandates of financial stability and
consumer protection. Four main approaches have so far emerged to meet
this challenge.
The first approach involves doing nothing: either by intent or
otherwise. Doing nothing can involve simply not regulating FinTech and
the result can be either permissive or laissez-faire depending upon
whether current banking regulation applies to the sector. China, especially
before 2015, is often highlighted as the leading, and highly successful,
s-for-implementing-a-responsible-innovation-framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CVX-
J72Y].
46. See Daniel Gorfine, Dir. of LabCFTC & Chief Innovation Officer, Keynote
Address at the 33rd Annual FIA Futures &Options Expo (Oct. 19, 2017), http://www.cftc
.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagorfine-1 [https://perma.cc/9TXX-WPR7].
47. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
48. Reflected in Goal 8 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and
in the 2014 G20 Financial Inclusion Action Plan. U.N. Secretary-General, Progress
Towards the Sustainable Development Goals, at 10–11, U.N. Doc. E/2017/66 (May 11,
2017); GLOB. P’SHIP FOR FIN. INCLUSION, 2014 FINANCIAL INCLUSION ACTION PLAN 2
(2014), http://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/2014_g20_financial_inclusion
_action_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F2T-SG6N].
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example of the permissive approach.49 While the relative inefficiencies of
the Chinese financial system combined with the government’s
prioritization of growth and innovation largely explain the benefits of
allowing development to take place largely without regulatory
intervention, 50 innovation can also bring risks, as occurred in China,
resulting since 2015 in a much more cautious regulatory approach.51
Doing nothing however can also simply involve requiring FinTechs to
comply with existing financial regulatory requirements, often with highly
restrictive results. This may well protect against risk but at the cost of
stifling innovation; and this has been the approach of most jurisdictions
to date.
Second, regulators can choose to allow certain amounts of flexibility
on a case-by-case basis, in what could be classified as a cautiously
permissive approach based on forbearance.52 Indeed, many regulators
facing innovation, and equipped by the legislature with a mandate
allowing growth and/or financial development to be considered along
with their primary mandates of financial stability and consumer
protection, have granted no-action letters, restricted licenses, special
charters or partial exemptions for innovative firms, or established
intermediaries testing new technologies, respectively. This approach also
allows regulators to acquire sufficient data and experience with
49. See Arner et al., supra note 2, at 1298–99; Weihuan Zhou et al., China’s
Regulation of Digital Financial Services: Some Recent Developments, 90 AUSTL. L.J.
297 (2016); Sonia Barquin & Vinayak HV, Capitalizing on Asia’s Digital-Banking
Boom, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Mar. 2015), www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-
services/our-insights/capitalizing-on-asias-digital-banking-boom [https://perma.cc/ZK
9T-XVTT].
50. See Christian Haddad & Lars Hornuf, The Emergence of the Global FinTech
Market: Economic and Technical Determinants 20 (CESifo Working Paper No. 6131,
2016) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2830124 [https://perma.cc/7LAB-TMBL] (arguing that
the soundness of the financial system has a negative effect on FinTech start-up dynamics,
i.e. financial systems with many deficits provide a vibrant environment for start-ups).
51. Weihuan Zhou et al., Regulation of Digital Financial Services in China: Last
Mover Advantage?, 8 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 25, 27 (2015); MCKINSEY & CO.,
DISRUPTION AND CONNECTION: CRACKING THE MYTHS OF CHINA INTERNET FINANCE
INNOVATION (2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/financial
%20services/our%20insights/whats%20next%20for%20chinas%20booming%20fintech
%20sector/disruption-and-connection-cracking-the-myths-of-china-internet-finance-
innovation.ashx [https://perma.cc/FW46-9T7F].
52. The same approach is suggested by Arner et al., supra note 2, at 1307–10.
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innovation, and has been followed by many regulators instead of
following China’s lead of initially not regulating innovations, and only
stepping in once the evolutionary process reaches a certain size and
significance.53
Third, regulators can provide a structured context for
experimentation, by instituting a regulatory sandbox or (as in China)
structured piloting exercises. While a new term in financial services, the
sandbox concept is by no means novel, with its origins in computer
science and other applications beyond financial services.54 In finance, a
regulatory sandbox refers to a regulatory “safe space” for experimentation
with new approaches involving the application of technology to finance.
At the most basic level, the sandbox creates an environment for
businesses to test products with less risk of being “punished” by the
regulator. 55 In return, regulators require applicants to incorporate
appropriate safeguards.56 There are currently at least sixteen sandboxes
announced or in operation. 57 Regulatory sandboxes seek to support
competitive innovation in financial markets. Eligibility to enter a sandbox
53. Douglas W. Arner & Janos N. Barberis, FinTech Regulations Recent
Developments and Outlook, ASIAN INST. INT’L. FIN. L. (2015); Brummer, supra note 2,
at 1048; Chiu, supra note 2, at 65–70; Cortez, supra note 2, at 201.
54. For instance, the government of the Australian state of New South Wales has
proposed, as part of its innovation strategy, a regulatory sandbox applying to all
provincial rules and regulations, including those on data privacy, and other potential
barriers to innovation. See N.S.W., BRINGING BIG IDEAS TO LIFE: NSW INNOVATION
STRATEGY 7 (2015), https://www.innovation.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/NSW_
Government_Innovation_Strategy_Document.pdf [https://perma.cc/USU7-PDSW].
55. DOUGLAS W. ARNER ET AL., CFA INST. RESEARCH FOUND., RESEARCH
FOUNDATION BRIEFS: FINTECH AND REGTECH IN A NUTSHELL, AND THE FUTURE IN A
SANDBOX (July 2017), https://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2470/rfbr.v3.n4.1 [https://per
ma.cc/MF49-Z559].
56. For instance, see Letter from Howard Lee, Senior Exec. Dir., H.K. Monetary
Auth., to Chief Exec., All Authorized Institutions (Sept. 6, 2016),
http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-and-circular/2016/
20160906e1.pdf [https://perma.cc/P578-LZV3]; see also MONETARY AUTH. OF SING.,
FINTECH REGULATORY SANDBOX GUIDELINES §§ 2.2, 6.2(g) (Nov. 16, 2016),
http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/Smart%20Financial%20Centre/Sandbox/FinTech%20
Regulatory%20Sandbox%20Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SGS-DELF]; BANK
NEGARA MALAY., FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY REGULATORY SANDBOX FRAMEWORK §§
6.1–6.3 (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=57&pg=137&ac=533&
bb=file [https://perma.cc/9G8M-7R9E].
57. See infra Part IV.
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is standardized and publicized, thus requiring market participants to
articulate their added-value in a pre-defined format. 58 This is cost-
effective for participants and resource-effective for regulators, allowing
easier comparison among potential entrants to the sandbox.
However, while providing transparency in entry criteria and
processes, sandboxes are very much human-driven and analogue in their
monitoring. Sandboxes, as currently conceived, are not scalable—the
eighteen (cohort 1) or twenty-four (cohort 2) participants59 in the U.K.
FCA sandboxes are insignificant relative to the over 56,000 licensed
market participants in the United Kingdom.60 For this reason, sandboxes
need to be made smarter and equipped to self-monitor activity within
them, as opposed to just being a process-driven application method for
entry, typically for a limited time, to a regulatory safe space, as they are
currently.
Fourth, a formal approach could be adopted, in which existing
regulations are reformed or new regulations are developed in order to
provide a more appropriate and balanced framework for new entrants and
new activities.
Support for competitive innovation in financial markets is certainly
not the exclusive preserve of developed jurisdictions, such as the United
States, the European Union and the United Kingdom. Financial
innovation has been transformative in emerging markets such as China,61
India62 and Kenya,63 all of which are taking a different approach to re-
58. This is particularly so in the leading example of the Financial Conduct Authority
in the UK, see, e.g., Arner et al., supra note 2, at 1316.
59. See infra Part IV.F.1.
60. About the FCA, FIN. CONDUCTAUTHORITY (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.fca.org.
uk/about/the-fca [https://perma.cc/549F-5LSS].
61. For example, Alibaba alone has fulfilled two main government policy objectives.
It has created 2.87 million direct and indirect opportunities, and provided over 400,000
SMEs with loans ranging from $3000 to $5000. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 1, at 24.
62. The best example is “India Stack,” a number of initiatives which set the stage for
a dramatic transformation and digitalization of the Indian financial system. See Abhijit
Bose, India’s FinTech Revolution is Primed to Put Banks Out of Business, TECHCRUNCH
(June 14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/14/indias-fintech-revolution-is-primed-
to-put-banks-out-of-business/ [https://perma.cc/3FJS-MYHP].
63. In particular, M-Pesa, the mobile money product under Safaricom. In under five
years, payments made through the platform surpassed 43% of Kenya’s GDP. See Daniel
Runde, M-Pesa and the Rise of the Global Mobile Money Market, FORBES (Aug. 12,
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thinking their financial markets and none of which have announced a
regulatory sandbox initiative.
This Article seeks to contribute to this current re-thinking and sketch
a roadmap to achieve a “golden mean” between innovation and traditional
regulatory objectives, which we term “smart regulation.”64
II. TRADITIONALAPPROACHES: TOREGULATE ORNOT
TOREGULATE?
Competition drives innovation. Regulators can create anti-
competitive rules and restrict entry to banking and other financial services
activities—a form of “financial repression” practiced by most economies
up to the mid-1980s. Or, on the other hand, regulators can take a range of
“light touch” approaches. 65 The strong deregulatory approach of the
Trump administration in the United States highlights the contemporary
importance and challenge of balancing financial stability, consumer
protection, innovation, and economic growth.
A. THE PRE-CRISISANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: PERMISSIVE VERSUS
RESTRICTIVE, RULES VERSUS PRINCIPLES
Prior to the 2008 Crisis, regulatory approaches to financial
innovation were typically framed in the context of “restrictive” or
“permissive” legal systems. 66 Under this framework of analysis,
2015, 4:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/08/12/m-pesa-and-the-
rise-of-the-global-mobile-money-market/#9c928ab5aecf [https://perma.cc/RJ6W-P932].
64. We found the term “smart regulation” in the context of environmental regulation,
referring to an appropriate order of enforcement measures imposed by regulators. See
Neil Gunningham et al., Introduction to SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 4, 22 (1999). For a brief discussion, see Neil Gunningham &
Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation, in REGULATORY THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND
APPLICATIONS 133–48 (Peter Drahos ed., 2017). We are not aware of its previous use in
the FinTech and RegTech context.
65. See Nigel Lawson, Foreword to BIGBANG 20 YEARSON, at iv (2006). See also,
as published on the eve of the GFC by the director of City of London’s Center of Policy
Studies, Andrew Hilton, All Regulation is Bad, in BIGBANG 20 YEARSON 24 (2006).
66. See Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based
Alternative?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. &COM. L. 273 (2011); see also Roger Brownsword
& Karen Yeung, Introduction to REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL FUTURES,
REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung
48 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
jurisdictions were subjected to quantitative analysis focusing on the
nature of their legal system, with common law systems generally framed
as permissive and civil law systems as restrictive.67 While this framework
was certainly not without fault,68 it provided the primary starting point for
most analyses of the interaction of regulation and innovation. Further,
financially repressive systems in many developing countries as well as
centrally planned economies restricted innovation, financial
development, and economic growth, resulting in lower levels of
development. 69 Research suggested that while crises might be more
common in more permissive systems, over the medium to long term the
benefits in terms of growth and development outweighed the costs of
periodic crises.70
This analytical approach—with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis—
became the guiding policy paradigm prior to the Crisis, with the focus in
developed, emerging, and developing countries towards financial
liberalization combined with development of appropriate systems of
prudential regulation in order to prevent and address crises.71 The focus
was thus one which favored financial innovation with (i) financial
stability and consumer protection to be achieved through risk-based
prudential regulation, (ii) disclosure to provide market discipline, and (iii)
enforcement to protect consumers (though generally leaving wholesale
institutional participants to protect their own interests, including through
processes of private ordering such as in the context of the International
Swaps and Derivative Association (ISDA), over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives, and the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR).72
Within this broader context, the quest for the best balance between
sufficient levels of regulation and permissiveness to support innovation
eds., 2008); Mark Fenwick et al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens when
Technology is Faster Than the Law (Tilburg Law & Econ. Ctr. Discussion Paper 2016–
04, Sep. 4, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531 [https://perma.cc/9FCJ-KA8L].
67. For the seminal treatment, see Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008).
68. See e.g., Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315
(2013).
69. See ARNER, supra note 13.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. For discussion of private orderings, see Dan Awrey, The Limits of Private
Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets, 34 REV. BANKING&FIN. L. 183 (2015).
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was often framed as the tension between rules and principles.73 Under this
framework, the question of how best to achieve the optimal balance was
contrasted between systems based on highly specific rules designed to
address all possible questions relating to particular products or services,
with the United States usually posited as the leading example, and
systems based on principles that provide guidance which could then be
applied to a variety of situations, with the United Kingdom as the
exemplar.
In the wake of the 2008 Crisis, this dominant paradigm has of
necessity been subject to reconsideration, with the regulatory pendulum
going from one extreme to the other. From 2008 up to approximately
2016, regulatory considerations at the international level as well as in
major jurisdictions, such as the United States and the European Union
(with the United Kingdom a part of its harmonized system of financial
regulation and supervision), were dominated by the necessity to
reregulate the financial system, so as to prevent future financial crises or
at least to put in place new regulatory frameworks which would have
prevented or ameliorated the 2008 Crisis.74
During this period of almost a decade following the Crisis, regulatory
discussions shifted from the pre-Crisis framework of restrictive versus
permissive and rules versus principles to comprehensive macro and micro
prudential frameworks combined with much broader consumer protection
efforts, with regulation moving beyond market failures and the efficient
markets hypotheses, yet with a new paradigm of understanding yet to
fully emerge.75 In the language of the G20, all aspects of the financial
sector should be subject to appropriate levels of regulation, with efforts
directed not only towards the largest too-big-to-fail financial institutions
at the heart of the Crisis (in the context comprehensive regulation of
“globally systemically important financial institutions” or G-SIFIs) but
also to all aspects of the financial system which were previously
unregulated or perceived to be under-regulated (mainly under the rubric
of “shadow banking”).76
73. See Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71 MOD. L.
REV. 59 (2008).
74. See BUCKLEY&ARNER, supra note 10.
75. See RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION (Ross P.
Buckley et al. eds. 2016).
76. See Douglas W. Arner, Adaptation and Resilience in Global Financial
Regulation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2011).
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In this post-Crisis regulatory environment, FinTech posed a
significant challenge; a challenge for which the pre-Crisis approaches
were no longer viewed as suitable. Nonetheless, the basic options
available in the context of regulation remained the same: to regulate or
not to regulate? In the pre-Crisis environment, the latter would have been
seen as the more appropriate approach. In the post-Crisis environment,
however, the choice is no longer so clear.
B. THE ZENAPPROACH: REGULATING AREVOLUTION BYDOINGNOTHING
Outside of the financial sector context, debates regarding the best
approaches to address innovation—particularly technological
innovation—typically center around questions of whether to regulate in
advance of innovation or whether to allow innovation to develop and then,
if necessary, regulate post development.77
China is often applauded for adopting a laissez-faire approach before
designing a comprehensive regulatory system approach for the new
environment.78 The approach allowed market participants to test without
immediate repercussions from the regulator. In practice, this meant that
China’s need for regulatory sandboxes was limited, as China itself
represented a sandbox on a national level. However, China did not persist
with its entirely laissez-faire approach. After Alibaba Group issued new
pooled products, regulators woke one morning to discover the world’s
fourth largest (USD 90 billion) money market fund had grown within only
nine months and is now the world’s largest money market fund at over
USD 225 billion.79 This lack of initial visibility and regulatory market
comprehension has pushed China to pursue a comprehensive new
77. See Ross P. Buckley et al., Financial Innovation in East Asia, 37 SEATTLE L.
REV. 307 (2014).
78. See Zhou et al., supra note 49, at 297–300.
79. Cf. TJUNTANG ET AL., BOS. CONSULTINGGRP., THERISE OFDIGITAL FINANCE IN
CHINA: NEW DRIVERS, NEW GAME, NEW STRATEGY 4 (Oct. 2014), http://image-
src.bcg.com/Images/BCG_The_Rise_of_Digital_Finance_in_China_Oct_2014_tcm52-
129223.pdf [https://perma.cc/DLL8-77AN]; Shaohui Tian, Alibaba’s Yu’e Bao Becomes
Largest Money Market Fund Globally, XINHUANET (Apr. 28, 2017, 5:30:35 PM),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/28/c_136243985.htm [https://perma.cc/T9
CA-JG65].
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regulatory approach, one that is stricter than before but still more balanced
and pro-innovation than in many other countries.80
It comes as no surprise that innovation is less restricted in less
regulated parts of the world.81 Even in the absence of prescriptive rules,
regulation can weaken innovative forces as the establishment of new,
solution-driven, potentially innovative firms is more expensive in a
strictly regulated environment than in an accommodative one.
If regulation is a barrier to entry for competition, the more regulation,
the less serious the competitive threats posed by non-regulated
technology firms to regulated financial institutions. Abolishing legislation
is an efficient way to even the playing field between these two competing
groups.82 However, markets, especially post-Crisis, operate in a highly
regulated environment. In practice, this means regulations need to be
abolished or repealed first. This is a gradual process which may take
significant time and lead to uncertain outcomes.
Most financial rules have their origin in crises or scandals. The
principle underlying a rule may be sound, while its crisis-driven extreme
variant may not. For instance, the core of the Volcker Rule83 in the United
80. Cf. Weihuan Zhou et al., Regulating FinTech in China: From Permissive to
Balance, in HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL FINANCE AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION:
CRYPTOCURRENCY, FINTECH, INSURTECH AND REGULATION (II), at 46 (David Lee &
Robert Deng eds., 2017).
81. For instance, in India, Kenya, and Uganda biometric data based on iris scan and
fingerprints taken via smart phones after birth provide the newborn’s initial identification
and functions as basis for issuing the birth certificate. See GSMA, REGULATORY AND
POLICY TRENDS IMPACTINGDIGITAL IDENTITY AND THE ROLE OFMOBILE 4, 10, 16 (Oct.
2016), https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Reg
ulatory-and-policy-trends-impacting-Digital-Identity-and-the-role-of-mobile.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U2HX-CXAQ].
82. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 3 (manuscript at 27) (arguing that an uneven
regulatory playing field between regulated and unregulated entities may increase
systemic risk given that regulated entities have higher costs and less entrepreneurial space
for experiments which will weaken their competitiveness over time).
83. See John C. Coates IV, The Volcker Rule as Structural Law: Implications for
Cost–Benefit Analysis and Administrative Law, 10 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 447 (2015); Julie
A.D. Manasfi, Systemic Risk and Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L.
REV. 181, 185–86 (2013); Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving
Financial Markets, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2011); Darrell Duffie, Market Making
Under the Proposed Volcker Rule 2–3 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper
Series No. 106, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990472 [https://perma.cc/WA9B-
9LLX].
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States is that a bank’s own speculative trading should not put the safety
of clients’ deposits at risk. Similar approaches have been taken around the
globe to insulate state-backed deposits from shareholder-backed trading
activity.84 While there may be some elements which should be improved,
the underlying rationale may well be sound. Take the example above:
trading activity backed by state-guaranteed deposits increases bank
managements’ moral hazard due to the implicit bail-out guarantee.
Similarly, inadequate sales practices regarding financial services put
consumers’ funds at risk and render efficient decision-making even more
difficult than with proper information disclosed. In turn, solicitation of
clients is regulated around the world. Removing these laws would unlock
innovation by financial entrepreneurs—but not all of this innovation
would necessarily benefit society.
The proponents of free markets often characterize regulation as
simply an unnecessary cost to business. Yet, regulations bring two
important benefits, in addition to their tradiational objectives of protecting
consumers and preventing financial crises: standardization and reduction
of transaction costs.
Standardization delivers economies of scale benefits and as such is
appealing in large markets (e.g. the European Union), but to a lesser
degree for regulators of smaller markets (e.g. Singapore). Harmonization
is coordinated by regulators across the world who interact through bodies
such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). 85 Any large-scale move away from
harmonized regulatory approaches will cast doubt on whether a
jurisdiction’s legal system is equivalent in form and substance to those in
other jurisdictions, potentially hindering global access and certainly
raising compliance costs for providers in addressing differing frameworks
across markets. The equivalence assessment allows the avoidance of
84. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., STRUCTURAL BANKING REFORMS: CROSS-
BORDER CONSISTENCIES AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS (Oct. 27,
2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141027.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UMN-
27YX].
85. SeeARNER, supra note 13.
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costly target markets’ rules when foreign firms offer financial services,86
a practice often referred to as substituted compliance.87
An example of regulation reducing costs is mandatory disclosure.
With the issuer or originator of a financial product being the entity that
has access to the information at the lowest cost (cheapest cost avoider),
any solution other than requiring disclosure by the issuer or originator
would require multiple market participants to gather the information, or
negotiate for it, separately. These transaction costs are removed by
mandated disclosure.88 Thus, even in the context of the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis, regulations requiring disclosure often play an important role.
For these reasons, plus the business certainty afforded by regulation,
the complete disengagement of regulators in financial markets is highly
unlikely, not least given the very recent memory of the Crisis in the minds
of many regulators.
C. SPECIFICREGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
At the other extreme is the traditional regulatory approach of
developing new regulations to address specific forms of new products
and/or institutions.
An increasing number of jurisdictions have developed and
implemented new legislative and/or regulatory frameworks to address
specific forms of FinTech innovation. According to the FSB:
86. See Dirk Zetzsche, Competitiveness of Financial Centers in Light of Financial
and Tax Law Equivalence Requirements, in RECONCEPTUALIZINGGLOBAL FINANCE AND
ITSREGULATION 391 (Ross P. Buckley et al. eds., 2016).
87. The United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) relies on
substituted compliance to determine eligibility of swap counterparties. See Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 701–74, 124
Stat. 1376, 1641–1802 (2010); Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of
the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,214 (July 17, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
ch. 1). See also Steven M. Davidoff, Rhetoric and Reality: A Historical Perspective on
the Regulation of Foreign Private Issuers, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 619, 633 (2010); Sean J.
Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market in
Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1293–94 (2014); Howell E. Jackson,
Substituted Compliance: The Emergence, Challenges, and Evolution of a New
Regulatory Paradigm, 1 J. FIN. REG. 169 (2015).
88. On mandatory disclosure, see Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, The Economics
of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future
Research, 54 J. ACCT. RES. 525, 555, 560 (2016).
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[w]hile many FinTech activities are covered within existing
regulatory frameworks, the FSB stocktake of regulatory approaches
to FinTech finds that a majority of jurisdictions (20 of 26) have
already taken or plan to take regulatory measures to respond to
FinTech[,] but the scope and scale of changes or planned changes vary
substantially. 89
To date, the largest number of these measures have focused on new
alternative financing techniques, such as equity crowdfunding and peer-
to-peer (P2P) lending.90 In particular, the JOBS Act91 with its Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation of crowdfunding,92 is an
important example of legislation designed to liberalize the existing
framework. 93 Following the United States’ lead and IOSCO’s
89. See FIN. STABILITYBD., supra note 27, at 24.
90. From an economic perspective, see Ajay Agrawal et al., Some Simple Economics
of Crowdfunding, 14 INNOVATION POL’Y& ECON. 63, 74 (2014); Ricarda B. Bouncken
et al., Crowdfunding: The Current State of Research, 14 INT’L. BUS. & ECON. RES. J. 407
(2015); A. Christine Hurt, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 224 (2015); Darian M. Ibrahim,
Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 569 (2015);
Gmeleen Faye Tomboc, The Lemons Problem in Crowdfunding, 30 J. INFO. TECH. &
PRIVACY L. 253, 256 (2013). From a legal perspective, see Andrew C. Fink, Protecting
the Crowd and Raising Capital through the CROWDFUND Act, 90 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 1, 8, 31 (2012); Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social
Networks and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be
Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735 (2012); Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and
for the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 831 (2014); Jorge Pesok, Crowdfunding: A New
Form of Investing Requires a New Form of Investor Protection, 12 DARTMOUTHL.J. 146,
149 (2014).
91. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
Title III, also known as the CROWDFUND Act, created a way for companies to use
crowdfunding to issue securities. Id. §§ 301–05, 126 Stat. at 315–23.
92. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 227, 232).
93. In many ways this is an example of the cautious permissiveness through
relaxation of existing requirements, discussed in the following Part. See C. Steven
Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG.
L.J. 195, 196 (2012); Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory
Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 283 (2014).
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recommendations,94 at least thirteen of twenty-six jurisdictions consulted
by the FSB legislated regarding crowdfunding or P2P finance.95
The other major area where new frameworks are being developed is
payment and settlement with thirteen of the twenty-six jurisdictions
consulted by the FSB reviewing their legislation on payments.96 With
United States regulators focused on implementing the provisions of the
Dodd-Frank-Act 97 (which in part relates to payment, clearing, and
settlement), 98 the most significant legislative response to new
technologies in this field has been the new European Union payments
framework known as the Payment Service Directive (PSD2). 99 Other
jurisdictions that have developed new legal frameworks in the payment
area include Hong Kong, Bahrain,100 Indonesia,101 and Australia where
94. BD.OF INT’LORG.OF SEC. COMM’NS, CROWDFUNDING 2015 SURVEYRESPONSES
REPORT (Dec. 2015), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD520.pdf
[https://perma.cc/62P7-KV25] [hereinafter IOSCO REPORT]; Statement on Addressing
Regulation of Crowdfunding, INT’L ORG. SEC. COMMISSIONS (Dec. 2015),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD521.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY7K-
LGQV] [hereinafter IOSCO Statement].
95. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 27, at 57. For an overview on European
crowdfunding legislation, see Commission Staff Working Document: Crowdfunding in
the EU Capital Markets Union, SWD (2016) 154 final (May 3, 2016); Dirk A. Zetzsche
& Christina D. Preiner, Cross-Border Crowdfunding—Towards a Single Crowdfunding
Market for Europe 3–4 (European Banking Inst. Working Paper Series, No. 8, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2991610 [https://perma.cc/2N2G-63EH].
96. See FIN. STABILITYBD., supra note 27, at 58.
97. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
98. For details, see COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, BANK FOR
INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 480 (2012), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d105_us.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM9
Z-SE2A].
99. The core of the new payments framework is the Payment Services (PSD 2) -
Directive. Council Directive 2015/2366, 2015 O.J. (L 337) 35, 53–54 (EU).
100. In 2014, the Central Bank of Bahrain initiated two new license types—payment
services and card processing services—allowing non-banks to provide banking services.
Central Bank of Bahrain Announces Landmark Regulatory Sandbox for Fintech Startups,
CENT. BANKBAHR. (June 14, 2017), http://www.cbb.gov.bh/page-p-central_bank_of_ba
hrain_announces_landmark_regulatory_sandbox_for_fintech_startups.htm [https://perm
a.cc/9M4P-82TA].
101. Implementation of Payment Transactions Processing, Bank Indonesia
Regulation No. 18/40/PBI/2016.
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providers of certain (low volume) non-cash payment facilities were
exempted from registration requirements.102
In the European Union, PSD2 aims to remove the monopoly of credit
institutions and banks on their customer’s account information and
payment services. 103 PSD2 enables bank customers to use third-party
providers to manage their finances. Banks are required to provide
these third-party providers access to their customers’ accounts
through open Application Program Interfaces (APIs).104 In turn, third-
party providers could offer financial services using bank data and
infrastructure as either an Account Information Service Provider (AISP)
using the account information of bank customers, or as a Payment
Initiation Service Provider (PISP) by initiating a payment or P2P transfer
on behalf of the customer.105 These third-party providers could include
telecommunication companies, social media, shopping platforms, or
value-added service providers, offering, for instance, facilitated transfers,
an aggregate overview of a user’s account information from several
banks, or financial analysis and advice, while the customers’ money
remains safely stored in the current bank account. PSD2 is expected to
fundamentally change the payments value chain, business profitability,
and customer expectations.106 PSD2 is important because it goes beyond
merely adding new elements to an existing framework but rather attempts
to transform the sector through technology—an example of the sort of
smart regulation we address in Part VI.
Beyond these grand projects we find small adjustments facilitating
FinTech in many jurisdictions. For instance, South Korea and Japan have
eased their regulations to support FinTech firms by allowing licensed
financial institutions to buy and hold large stakes in FinTech firms;
Korean industrial companies with high-end banking technology are
102. See Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Cth), ASIC
Corporations (Non-Cash Payment Facilities), 2016/211, 18 Mar. 2016, s 9 (Austl.).
103. Council Directive 2015/2366, 2015 O.J. (L 337) 35 (EU).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Viola Hellström, PSD2—The Directive That Will Change Banking As
We Know It, EVRY, https://www.evry.com/en/news/articles/psd2-the-directive-that-
will-change-banking-as-we-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/4WMQ-2EHH] (last visited Dec.
4, 2017).
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allowed to own online-only banks. 107 Although applicable to both
innovative and traditional businesses Australia’s exemptions for low
volume transactions 108 are another example of how to free small,
innovative firms from regulatory burdens. Another example is the United
Kingdom crown dependency of Jersey which implemented a class
exemption in relation to digital currencies. According to that class
exemption, which has been inadequately labeled a Digital Currency
Sandbox,109 operators of digital currency exchanges are exempt from
registration requirements if their annual turnover is less than GBP
150,000, following an application to the Jersey Financial Services
Commission.110
Finally, the United Kingdom provides an example of a jurisdiction
which has altered the mandate of its regulator to require considerations of
innovation and economic competitiveness in regulatory decisions.111 This
has forced the U.K. FCA to consider competitiveness issues in regulatory
decisions, moving beyond the approach common in a number of major
jurisdictions to consider only economic impact. In other jurisdictions,
such as Luxembourg, furthering innovation is treated as one aspect of
107. Kim Boram, Regulator Set to Allow Banks to Fund Fintech Firms, YONHAP
NEWSAGENCY (May 6, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2015
/05/06/77/0503000000AEN20150506002900320F.html [https://perma.cc/TG5D-AW
EP]; Adit Vaddi, Japan’s Financial Industry Is Now Finally Embracing Fintech, CROWD
VALLEY (Mar. 16, 2017), https://news.crowdvalley.com/news/japans-financial-industry-
is-now-finally-embracing-fintech [https://perma.cc/964S-HDTQ].
108. See Minister for Revenue and Financial Services (Cth), Corporations (Low
Volume Financial Markets), 2016/888, 22 Sept. 2016, s 5 (Austl.) (exempting certain low
volume financial markets from Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 7.4 (Austl.)). A range of
early stage FinTech applications could benefit from this exemption, including digital
currencies and peer-to-peer-financing platforms.
109. See Sara Johns & Steven Meacher, Jersey Lawmakers Create ‘Regulatory
Sandbox’ for Digital Currency Industry, INT’L INV. (Dec. 20, 2016),
http://www.internationalinvestment.net/products/investments/jersey-lawmakers-create-
regulatory-sandbox-digital-currency-industry/ [https://perma.cc/654F-9C92].
110. See Draft Proceeds of Crime (Miscellaneous Amendments) (Jersey) Regulations
201-, P.44/2016, 4 May 2016.
111. See Elena Carletti & Agnieszka Smolenska, 10 Years on from the Financial
Crisis: Co-operation Between Competition Agencies and Regulators in the Financial
Sector 27 (Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Paper No.
DAF/COMP/WP2(2017)8), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocu
mentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WP2%282017%298&docLanguage=En [https://perma.cc/
UN4V-T454].
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maintaining financial system stability, which can be seen not only from
the standpoint of preventing financial crises but also from enhancing the
functioning of the financial system. With Europe’s PSD2, a mandate to
promote innovation is implicit in the legislation, but regardless some
jurisdictions, such as Germany, construe their mandate narrowly and
require an explicit mandate to further innovation as a precondition for
extensive waivers.112 A similar issue arises in the conflict between federal
and state regulators in the United States. In April, 2017, states represented
by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, challenged a FinTech
special charter issued by the OCC on the grounds that the Office lacks a
mandate to further innovation.113 The capacity of the OCC’s plans to
charter FinTech companies as “special national banks” was challenged,
inter alia, on the grounds that to do so exceeds the OCC’s statutory
authority.114
Beyond these traditional approaches of doing nothing and crafting
new regulations lie a range of other alternatives to addressing innovation,
the first of which is the cautiously permissive case-by-case approach.
III. THECASE-BY-CASEAPPROACH: FORBEARANCE, RESTRICTED
LICENSES, AND SPECIALCHARTERS
A. PARTIAL EXEMPTION ORDISPENSATION
In between the traditional choices of doing nothing and developing
completely new regulatory frameworks, regulators can carve out pockets
of activities (i.e. defined by product, scope, or scale) where participants
can benefit on a case-by-case basis from regulatory forbearance (such as
“no-action” letters in the United States) or from restricted licenses or
112. See BUNDESANSTALT FÜRFINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSAUFSICHT (BAFIN) (FED. FIN.
SUPERVISORYAUTH.), ANNUALREPORT 40–41 (2015), https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs
/Downloads/EN/Jahresbericht/dl_jb_2015_en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
[https://perma.cc/F4XM-MLQ4] (arguing that a regulatory sandbox requires a broader
mandate than granted by Parliament to the BaFin).
113. V. Gerard Comizio & Nathan S. Brownback, State Bank Regulators Challenge
OCC’s Authority to Issue FinTech Charters, HARV. L. SCH. F. ONCORP. GOVERNANCE&
FIN. REG. (June 4, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/04/state-bank-
regulators-challenge-occs-authority-to-issue-fintech-charters/ [https://perma.cc/2AWP-
H842].
114. Id.
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special charters (such as the OCC’s for banks 115 ). In return for the
regulator’s “clarification” that the FinTech firm’s activity is outside the
scope of certain rules which are viewed as unnecessary or inappropriate
under the circumstances or in the specific context, the no-action letter or
restricted license may be supplemented with conditions seeking to ensure
that even if certain rules do not apply, the principles underlying the
regulation are still upheld. The practical effect of forbearance through no-
action letters, restricted licensing, or special charters is that of partial
exemptions or dispensation within a broader regulatory framework.
The Dutch regulators DNB/AMF give the following example of how
they would conclude that some dispensation from mandatory law
governing client on-boarding is in order:
An innovative type of asset management enables customers to
gradually build their wealth through incremental accounts, with the
investment company conducting a step-by-step inventory of each
customer’s financial position, knowledge, experience, objectives and
risk appetite as time goes on. If supervisors find the investment
company to be acting in the spirit of the law, i.e. to be scrupulously
observing its duty of care, they may judge that it is unreasonable to
demand the same thorough initial intake process as is customary in
asset management where initial outlays are substantially steeper and a
full profile is drawn up at a first meeting.116
B. REGULATORS’DISCRETION
The extent regulators can make use of forbearance through no-action
letters or restricted licensing depends on their specific legislative context.
While some discretion is available in most jurisdictions, the relation
between the generic and specific provisions, as established in the
country’s legal framework (particularly administrative case law in many
instances), determines the extent to which regulators may require
115. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Issues Draft
Licensing Manual Supplement for Evaluating Charter Applications from Financial
Technology Companies, Will Accept Comments Through April 14 (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2017/nr-occ-2017-31.html
[https://perma.cc/S2CU-W4AD].
116. See AUTHORITY FOR THE FIN. MKT. & DENEDERLANDSCHE BANK, MORE ROOM
FOR INNOVATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 4 (Dec. 2016), https://www.afm.nl/~/profme
dia/files/onderwerpen/innovation-hub/publicaties/2016/room-for-innovation-in-
financial-sector.ashx [https://perma.cc/CT94-B9F3].
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legislative action (such as amendment of laws) prior to granting
exemptions. For instance, the German regulator BaFin re-read the
German banking act in a way to enable video chat identification of bank
clients,117 but could not re-read the German investment fund act, applying
to fund management companies and depositories, in a similar way. At the
same time, the Luxembourg CSSF read basically the same European
Union rules in a way that enabled fund managers and investment firms to
allow video authentication118—and thereby expand the benefits of internet
authentication to their core constituency.
While some legislation allows for no-action letters and/or restricted
licensing,119 even in the absence of explicit legislation, special charters
are an established feature of administrative law used to provide regulatory
dispensation on a case-by-case basis by regulators worldwide.120 Major
117. See Videoidentifizierungsverfahren (Rundschreiben 04/2016): Übergangsfrist,
BUNDESANSTALT FÜR FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSAUFSICHT (July 11, 2016), https://www.b
afin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Meldung/2016/meldung_160711_videoid
ent.html [https://perma.cc/E3YF-THRZ].
118. See Identification/Verification Through Video Chat, Commission de
Surveillance du Secteur Financier (2016), http://www.cssf.lu/fileadmin/files/LBC_FT/F
AQ_LBCFT_VIDEO_IDENTIFICATION_080416.pdf [https://perma.cc/62V5-33YR].
119. For Europe, the dispensation from capital requirements granted to certain banks
and investment firms meeting the conditions of the Capital Requirements Regulation,
Council Directive 575/2013, art. 4, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 3 (EU), and the license for “small”
Managers of Alternative Investment Funds pursuant to Council Directive 2011/61, art. 3,
2011 O.J. (L 174) 1 (EU). For details, see Dirk A. Zetzsche & Christina D. Preiner, Scope
of the AIFMD, in THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE 49, 50
(2d ed. 2015).
120. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THECURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL
PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 3–4 (Dec. 2016),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-
bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y96W-PEHG] (stating that the OCC has
a long standing practice of granting special national bank charters for banks limiting their
activities to fiduciary services, including trust banks and credit card banks). See for
Europe, the right to grant restricted licenses under the Council Directive 2011/61, art.
8(4), 2011 O.J. (L 174) 21 (EU), stating “[t]he competent authorities of the homeMember
State of the AIFM may restrict the scope of the authorisation, in particular as regards the
investment strategies of AIFs the AIFM is allowed to manage.” For details, see Dirk
Zetzsche & David Eckner, Appointment, Authorization and Organization of the AIFM,
in THEALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUNDMANAGERSDIRECTIVE 193–242 (2d ed. 2015).
The same power is granted to competent authorities of European Union Member States
under national administrative law. The German regulator BaFin explicitly refers to this
option. See BAFIN, supra note 112, at 41 (In the context of regulatory sandbox one
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regulators such as in the United States, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, or
Germany, with hundreds of banks and insurance undertakings under their
respective supervision, gather experience with conduct that imposes risks
on clients and the system frommany sources.121 This means they are well-
equipped to identify conduct that only represents minor risks, or that may
be good market practice, and can then reduce the regulatory burden by
measures such as no-action letters, conditional dispensations (restricted
licensing), or an official special charter policy.
C. UPSIDES
The institutionalized communication between regulators and
FinTechs through innovation hubs122 provides the background for partial
exemptions on a case-by-case basis and means regulators retain access to
high levels of information—they remain connected to a fast-changing
“aspect is often left out of account: regulatory requirements can be scaled down –
including in German supervisory laws: the Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz), for
example, does not require every business model to have a full banking licence. BaFin can
also grant authorisations for selected banking activities and financial services. Although
a company holding this type of licence is then restricted in terms of its business activity,
the list of requirements it has to meet is also scaled down accordingly. . . . [S]ome rules
cannot be changed, but wherever the legislators have only specified an outline, BaFin
makes its requirements on companies dependent on risk and the complexity of their
business in order to reflect the principle of proportionality.”).
121. See Policy on No-Action Letters; Information Collection, CFPB No. 2014-0025
(Feb. 2, 2016); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING
RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE
(Mar. 2016), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-
reports/pub-responsible-innovation-banking-system-occ-perspective.pdf [https://perma.
cc/6434-AG3E]. Implementing the strategy, the OCC published draft guidelines inMarch
2017, see OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING
MANUAL DRAFT SUPPLEMENT: EVALUATING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (Mar. 2017), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-
by-type/licensing-manuals/file-pub-lm-fintech-licensing-manual-supplement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8UZJ-MQBP]. In addition to the CFPB and the OCC, the SEC seeks a
key role in furthering innovation, see JD Alois, SEC Commissioner Piwowar: “The Great
Potential of Fintech Should Not Be Hindered by Our Current Regulatory Structure”,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Nov. 20, 2016, 5:19 PM), http://www.crowdfund
insider.com/2016/11/92769-sec-commissioner-piwowar-great-potential-fintech-not-hin
dered-current-regulatory-structure/ [https://perma.cc/AJC7-V97R].
122. See supra Part I.B.
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innovative marketplace and can adjust their approaches and policies on a
case-by-case basis accordingly.
Another upside of case-by-case assessment is risk control. Instead of
exemptions which end the flow of information from licensed entities,
regulators see the business models and are entitled to request
clarifications and risk assessments in firms’ business plans.
Financial centers find themselves increasingly in competition for
innovative start-ups. A partial exemption approach is hard to copy, given
that few other regulators have the necessary expertise upon which to make
sound judgements. Moreover, the restricted licenses may come with
cross-border recognition, i.e. the license may grant market access. For
instance, the OCC’s special national bank charter comes with the right to
pursue the licensed activities across the United States. Similarly, the
license granted by a regulator of the European Union and European
Economic Area Member States, or in some instances even an European
Union regulator, comes with the right to offer services cross-border in all
European Union and European Economic Area states, i.e. in markets
currently comprising 510 million consumers. For these reasons, case-by-
case flexibility and dispensations comprise a comparative advantage of
the major regulators.
D. RISKS
However, this advantage comes with a limitation, in terms of
scalability and accuracy.While small or highly specialized (e.g. payments
or investment funds only) FinTech ecosystems are well-suited for such a
bespoke model, as the number and variety of potential actors requesting
exemptions increases, the strain on regulatory capacity to process these
requests mounts. In addition to the costs of the case-by-case assessments,
ensuring the equal treatment of participants is difficult. Case-by-case
assessment comes with the risks of errors, which could distort
competition and lead to suboptimal production of financial services.
Alternatively the permitted conduct may prove harmful to clients or the
financial system at large, or the service may turn out to have broader
effects on the financial system than previously assumed by regulators.
This may not only harm the regulators’ reputation, but could also lead to
liability.
If judges hold the no-action letter, restricted license, special charter,
or other forbearance approach to violate mandatory law, the regulators’
conduct may be found to be negligent if not backed up by the legislature.
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This prospect of potential liability may lead to suboptimal levels of
dispensation practice.
Moreover, the benchmarks for a regulator’s dispensation practice
may be called into question: should consumer protection and systemic
risk prevention dominate, or should the focus be on competitiveness and
innovation? For instance, should the regulator of a financial product
generating state123 focus on job creation, while that of a distribution state
seek to shield local market participants from foreign competition?
All in all, forbearance-based case-by-case experimentation through
no-action letters, special charters, and restricted licenses comes with
downsides for regulators, FinTechs, and society. For regulators one
downside is the risk of liability for decisions. For FinTechs, the process
of obtaining such forbearance through a no-action letter, restricted
license, or special charter application is often costly. Firms will require
lawyers to help communicate with regulators, and assemble and file
applications and reports. Given that determination will be on a case-by-
case basis, each application will require in-depth development and will
not be a standardized off-the-shelf solution. In some cases, FinTechs will
find themselves, from the outset, falling within existing laws or
regulations, and may need to develop detailed arguments regarding
justification for special treatment of their specific application. The
associated costs raise the minimum capital necessary to start an
innovative firm, and increase entrepreneurs’ funding difficulties. For
society, the principal costs may arise either from a suboptimal level of
dispensation, or from excessive dispensation leading to unacceptable
risks and consumer losses.
E. OVERALLASSESSMENT
On balance, cautious experimentation on a case-by-case basis
through forbearance via no-action letters, restricted licenses, special
charters, and the like provides a useful tool for regulators to perform
market discovery (i.e. acquire knowledge of start-ups, develop
understanding of business models, and identify regulatory perimeters of
modern technologies). However, this should only be a temporary tool as
it is not suitable for market-wide use given its case-by-case nature.
Further, it fails to provide long-term legal certainty for business
123. For the distinction between production and distribution countries with respect to
financial services, see Zetzsche, supra note 86, at 391.
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development and is not an international standardization tool. These
downsides have led to experiments with more structured approaches in an
increasing range of jurisdictions, such as regulatory sandboxes.
IV. STRUCTUREDEXPERIMENTALISM: REGULATORY SANDBOXES
In finance, a regulatory sandbox refers to a regulatory “safe space”
for innovative financial institutions and activities underpinned by
technology. At the most basic level, the sandbox creates an environment
for businesses to test products with less risk of being “punished” by the
regulator for non-compliance. In return, regulators require applicants to
incorporate appropriate safeguards to insulate the market from risks of
their innovative business.124
Regulatory sandboxes can avoid some of the downsides just
outlined. Sandboxes’ pre-defined entry (and exit) criteria provide greater
transparency and replicability than prior approaches.
To our knowledge, as of August 1, 2017, there are currently fourteen
sandboxes in operation, and at least two others announced, with draft bills
in the legislative process:
Table 1: Regulatory Sandboxes in Operation Sorted by Location and
Start Date
United
Kingdom
(4/2016)125
Hong Kong
(9/2016)126
Malaysia
(10/2016)127
Singapore
(11/2016)128
124. See, e.g., Letter from Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Exec., H.K. Monetary Auth.,
to Chief Exec., All Authorized Institutions (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.hkma.gov.hk/med
ia/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-and-circular/2016/20160906e1.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/L2GE-Q6WF] [hereinafter HKMA FSS]; MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., supra note
56, at §§ 2.2, 6.2.f, 6.2.g; BANKNEGARAMALAY., supra note 56, § 6.1.
125. See, e.g., MONETARYAUTH.OF SING., supra note 56, at §§ 2.2, 6.2.f, 6.2.g; BANK
NEGARAMALAY., supra note 56, § 6.1; HKMA FSS, supra note 124, at 2.
126. See HKMA FSS, supra note 124, at 1.
127. See BANKNEGARAMALAY., supra note 56.
128. SeeMONETARYAUTH. OF SING., supra note 56.
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Abu Dhabi
(11/2016)129
Australia
(12/2016)130
Mauritius
(1/2017)131
Netherlands
(1/2017)132
Indonesia
(9/2016)133
Brunei
Darussalam
(2/2017)134
Canada
(2/2017)135
Thailand
(3/2017)136
129. See ABU DHABI GLOB. MKT. FIN. SERVS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINTECH
REGULATORY LABORATORYGUIDANCE (2016), https://www.adgm.com/media/85833/fin
tech-reglab-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ6U-2HSK].
130. See AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REGULATORYGUIDENO. 257: TESTING
FINTECH PRODUCTS AND SERVICES WITHOUT HOLDING AN AFS OR CREDIT LICENCE
(2017), http://download.asic.gov.au/media/4160999/rg257-published-24-february-2017.
pdf [https://perma.cc/G8DT-8E4W].
131. See MAURITIUS BD. OF INV., REGULATORY SANDBOX LICENSE: GUIDELINES,
http://www.investmauritius.com/media/389644/Guidelines-RSL.pdf [https://perma.ccS5
6V-MYAD] (last visited Dec. 7, 2017).
132. See AUTHORITY FOR THE FIN. MKT. & DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, supra note
116.
133. See Press Release, Bank Indon., Five Bank Indonesia Initiatives for the Payment
System (Sept. 2, 2016) (on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law);
Press Release, Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, OJK Drafts Regulations on Fintech Development
(Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.ojk.go.id/en/berita-dan-kegiatan/siaran-pers/Documents/Page
s/Press-Release-OJK-Drafts-Regulations-on-Fintech-Development1/SIARAN%20PER
S%20FINTECH-ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2L6-XJYN].
134. See AUTORITI MONETARI BRUNEI DARUSSALEM, GUIDELINES NO. FTU/G-
1/2017/1: FINTECH REGULATORY SANDBOXGUIDELINES (2017).
135. See Press Release, Canadian Sec. Adm’rs, The Canadian Securities Regulators
Launches a Regulatory Sandbox Initiative (Feb. 23, 2013), https://www.securities-
administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=1555 [https://perma.cc/3YVU-K2VT]. The Ontario
Securities Commission opened the door for a sandbox with a no-action letter dated 24
October 2016. See Sec. Legislation of Ont. v. Angellist, LLC (2016), 39 O.S.C. Bull.
8903, 8903 (Can. Ont. Sec. Com.). To our knowledge, besides the announcement of a
sandbox, there is no formal document summarizing sandbox conditions so far.
136. See FinTech Update: Thailand’s FinTech Regulatory Sandbox, BAKER
MCKENZIE (Oct. 2016), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publicatio
ns/2016/10/fintech-update/al_bangkok_fintechsandbox_oct16.pdf?la=en [hereinafter
Bank of Thailand Sandbox] (for the sandbox of the Bank of Thailand); see also, Komkrit
Kietduriyakul, Thailand: Fintech 2016 Highlights and Beyond, BAKERMCKENZIE (Dec.
29, 2016), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2016/12/fintech-
2016-highlights-and-beyond [hereinafter Thai SEC Sandbox] (for the sandbox of the Thai
Securities and Exchange Commission); Pawee Sirimai Darana Chudasri, SEC Readies
Sandbox for Fintech Firms, BANGKOK POST (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.pressreader.c
om/thailand/bangkok-post/20170221/281947427615137.
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Bahrain
(6/2017)137
Switzerland
(8/2017)138
Table 2: Regulatory Sandboxes Announced
Taiwan139 Japan140
In a range of jurisdictions, sandbox proposals have been widely
discussed and considered by regulators, but neither rejected nor officially
adopted (see Table 3).
137. See CENTRAL BANK OF BAHR., REGULATORY SANDBOX CONSULTATION PAPER
(Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.cbb.gov.bh/assets/Consultations/Consultation-Regulatory%
20Sandbox-%2028March%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PW5-KVEG]; CENTRAL
BANK OFBAHR., REGULATORY SANDBOX FRAMEWORK (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.cbb.
gov.bh/assets/Regulatory%20Sandbox/Regulatory%20Sandbox%20Framework-Amend
ed28Aug2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y86-CAXH] [hereinafter BAHRAIN SANDBOX
RULES].
138. See Federal Council Put New FinTech Rules Into Force, FED. COUNCIL (July 5,
2017), https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases/media-release
s-federal-council.msg-id-67436.html [https://perma.cc/DS7Z-NTW9]; see Bundesrat/
EFD, Änderung der Bankenverordnung durch die Vernehmlassungsvorlage (Feb. 1,
2017), https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/47043.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/RR63-5NL6] [hereinafter “Vernehmlassungsvorlage”]; EIDGENÖSSISCHES
FINANZDEPARTEMENT, REGULIERUNGSFOLGENABSCHÄTZUNG: ÄNDERUNG DER
BANKENVERORDNUNG (FINTECH) (July 5, 2017), https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/
message/attachments/49030.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW8A-89QT].
139. See Ted Chen, FSC Finalizes ‘Regulatory Sandbox’ Bill, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb. 11,
2017), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2017/02/11/2003664741 [https://
perma.cc/CS9F-XAXH] (reviewing government plan to introduce sandbox program);
Formosa Transnational, Amendments to Eight Financial Laws for Regulatory Sandbox
(Jan. 9, 2017) (on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law).
140. See Japan Seeks Deregulated ‘Sandbox’ to Free Up Innovation, NIKKEI ASIAN
REVIEW (May 12, 2017, 4:25 AM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-
Politics/Japan-Seeks-deregulated-sandbox-to-free-up-innovation [https://perma.cc/M8
LE-82FL] (citing a government plan to adopt a deregulated sandbox as part of the
Abenomics growth strategy).
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Table 3: Regulatory Sandboxes Considered
United States141 European
Union142
Ireland143 Norway144
141. See Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016, H.R. 6118, 114th Cong. (2d Sess.
2016). The agency in charge may modify or waive the application of a federal statute if
it determines the regulation is “burdensome” to the petitioner. Id. § 4(d).
142. See EUROPEAN BANKING FED’N, EUROPEAN BANKING FEDERATION (EBF)’S
RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S CONSULTATION ON FINTECH: A MORE
COMPETITIVE AND INNOVATIVE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SECTOR 48, 52 (June 15, 2017),
http://www.ebf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/EBF_026943-Fintech-
consultation_EBF-response_15.06.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/DWE4-7SSU] (promoting
a sandbox); EUROPEAN BANKING FED’N, supra note 6, at 28–29; EUROPEAN SEC. &
MKTS. AUTH., ESMA RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S CONSULTATION ON
FINTECH: AMORECOMPETITIVEAND INNOVATIVEEUROPEANFINANCIALSECTOR 7 (June
7, 2017), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-158-457_respo
nse_to_the_ec_consultation_on_fintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JE4-C4ZD] (stating that
Fintech start-ups might need more advice or help from supervisors “to navigate the
applicable legal framework. In that sense, innovation hubs or other dedicated structures
recently created in some national competent authorities and that are aimed at guiding and
advising Fintech start-ups are interesting and should be encouraged.”); EUR. BANKING
AUTHORITY, supra note 6, at 9, 32–33 (announcing further inquiry into regulatory
sandboxes); EUR. COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 17.
143. See Brian Hayes, Member of the European Parliament, Address to the Banking
and Payments Federation Ireland Conference on Digital Transformation in Financial
Services (Mar. 9, 2017) (transcript available at https://brianhayesdublin.wordpress.com/2
017/03/09/its-time-for-the-central-bank-and-dept-finance-to-develop-a-regulatory-sand
box-for-new-financial-firms-hayes./ [https://perma.cc/EHY5-99SL]).
144. Randi Jørum Sulland & Tore Mydske, Norway Prepares for the Implementation
of PSD2, THOMMESSEN (Apr. 2017), https://www.thommessen.no/globalassets/nyheter/fi
rmanytt/pfl-april-2017—-8-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XUV-8M9W].
68 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
Denmark China145 Spain146 Sweden147
Mexico148 Turkey149 Saudi Arabia150 Luxembourg
Although approaches differ with regard to definitions, features, and
practical importance, some common characteristics of sandboxes can be
identified.
A. OBJECTIVE
Regulators implementing sandboxes generally define their
objectives in the context of support for innovation,151 market development
and enhanced competition, 152 and/or economic growth, 153 with exact
objectives varying with the particular regulator’s statutory mandate.
Justifications often seek to draw from experiences in other contexts,
such as those relating to pharmaceuticals or other industries involving
human testing of products prior to approval. As an example, the U.K.
FCA, in an analogy with the “Clinical Trial Period” for pharmaceuticals,
145. See The PBOC Suggests Digital Financial Services Experiment in Regulated
Innovation Sandbox, 8BTC (July 22, 2017), http://news.8btc.com/the-pboc-suggests-
digital-financial-services-experiment-in-regulated-innovation-sandbox [https://perma.cc
/365Y-ZKPU] (citing an official of the PBOC’s Monetary Policy Committee saying that
China can either adopt a sandbox or “set up an innovation center where FinTech startups
are allowed to conduct certain financial services under the terms of a conditional or
restricted license. If the test succeeds, they will be able to get a full branch license to
perform wider services. If failed, then the license will be revoked.”).
146. See ASOCIACIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE FINTECH E INSURTECH, LIBRO BLANCO DE LA
REGULACIÓN FINTECH EN ESPANA (2017), https://asociacionfintech.es/download/libro-
blanco-fintech-e-insurtech/?wpdmdl=837 [https://perma.cc/V52L-WEJC].
147. See Pearse, supra note 43, at 2.
148. See FIN. STABILITYBD., supra note 27, at 58.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., supra note 56, §§ 2.1, 2.2; see also Press
Release, Bank Indon., supra note 133.
152. See MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., supra note 56, § 6.2(a)–(b) (detailing the
proposal to support the sandbox evaluation criteria); Press Release, Bank Indon., supra
note 133; see also FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX (Nov. 2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z5K5-3DFF].
153. SeeBANKNEGARAMALAY., supra note 56, § 5.1(a); FIN. CONDUCTAUTH., supra
note 152, at 1.
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expects the sandbox to reduce the time to market by thirty-three percent
(equivalent to eight percent of a product’s lifetime revenue) and to
facilitate the FinTech’s access to finance, thereby raising its valuation by
fifteen percent, and for both these reasons, to enable more innovations to
reach the market.154
B. SANDBOXCONDITIONS
1. Entry Test
As both a legal and economic precondition, regulators around the
world generally establish some sort of entry test to determine whether a
firm is qualified to “play in the sandbox.”
First, the test determines whether the intended technology, service,
or activity is appropriate for the sandbox. For example, for entry into the
sandbox, the proposed entrant must:
 support the financial services industry;155
 provide genuine innovation, i.e. new solutions to existing or new
problems;156 and
154. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 152, at 5 (referring to medical and
biopharmaceutical research).
155. See AUTHORITY FOR THE FIN. MKT. & DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, supra note
116, at 3–4; BANK NEGARAMALAY., supra note 56, § 5.1; FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra
note 152, § 3.4; FIN. SUPERVISORY COMMISSION CHINA (TAIWAN), supra note 41; Bank
of Thailand Sandbox, supra note 136, § A.3. Bank Indonesia has not defined a rigid
regulatory screening for the entrant to enter into the sandbox yet, however, it has a clear
goal to support the financial services industry. LAPORAN TAHUNAN BANK INDON.,
ANNUAL REPORT 108–10 (2016), http://www.bi.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-
tahunan/bi/Documents/LKTBI2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/J573-SLG8]; see also ABU
DHABI GLOB. MKT., POLICY CONSULTATION ON A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO
SUPPORT PARTICIPANTS DEPLOYING INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY WITHIN THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES SECTOR 4 (May 10, 2016), https://adgm.com/media/70182/adgm-consult-
paper-no-2-of-2016_reg-framewk-for-fintech-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/F59J-RN9W];
MAURITIUSBD.OF INV., supra note 131, at 8; Press Release, Gubernur BI Resmikan Bank
Indon. Fintech Office (Nov. 14, 2016) (on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law) (stating the four objectives of the FinTech office establishment).
156. See ABU DHABI GLOB. MKT, supra note 155, at 13; AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS.
COMM’N, supra note 130, § RG 257.45; AUTHORITY FOR THE FIN. MKT. & DE
NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, supra note 116, at 3; AUTORITI MONETARI BRUNEI
DARUSSALEM, supra note 134, § 7.2(a); (section 3.4); BANKNEGARAMALAY., supra note
56, § 5.1; EIDGENÖSSISCHES FINANZDEPARTEMENT, ÄNDERUNG DES BANKENGESETZES
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 benefit consumers.157
The first innovation test is debatable, given that it asks regulators to
assess an innovation, a task arguably far beyond their skill set. It is no
surprise therefore that some regulators, such as Australia’s ASIC, decline
to undertake a full review of the business model and focus principally on
risk considerations.
As to risk, sandbox rules158 ask regulators to look at whether the
product or service enhances:
 market stability;
 market transparency; or
UND DER BANKENVERORDNUNG (FINTECH): ERLÄUTERNDER BERICHT ZUR
VERNEHMLASSUNGSVORLAGE 33 (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/me
ssage/attachments/47046.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3S8-JRQD]; FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.,
supra note 152, § 3.4; LAPORAN TAHUNAN BANK INDON., supra note 155, at 108–110;
MAURITIUSBD. OF INV., supra note 131, at 8; MONETARYAUTH. OF SING., supra note 56,
§ 6.2.(a); TAIWAN FIN. SUPERVISORYCOMM’N, FINANCIALOUTLOOKMONTHLYNO. 147,
at 5–6 (Feb. 2017); Bank of Thailand Sandbox, supra note 136, §A.3; Press Release,
Gubernur BI Resmikan Bank Indon. Fintech Office, supra note 155.
157. See ABU DHABI GLOB. MKT, supra note 155, at 13–14; AUTORITI MONETARI
BRUNEI DARUSSALEM, supra note 134, § 7.2.(a)(iii); FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note
152, § 3.4; LAPORANTAHUNANBANK INDON., supra note 155, at 110; MAURITIUSBD. OF
INV., supra note 131, at 8; MONETARYAUTH. OF SING., supra note 56, at § 6.2(b); Bank
of Thailand Sandbox, supra note 136 § A.3; Press Release, Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, supra
note 133 (stating that regulations concerning the sandbox “specify the minimum
requirements that need to be satisfied, so the industry’s development will be supported
by the legal grounds essential for attracting investments and protecting consumer
interests towards efficient and sustainable growth”).
158. See ABU DHABI GLOB. MKT., supra note 155, at 6; AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS.
COMM’N, supra note 130, § RG 257.3; AUTHORITY FOR THE FIN. MKT. & DE
NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, supra note 116, at 3; AUTORITI MONETARI BRUNEI
DARUSSALEM, supra note 134, at §§ 3.3, 7.2(a)(ii), 7.2(e), 8.4, 9.4(c), 10.3; BANK
NEGARA MALAY., supra note 56, § 5.1(a); EIDGENÖSSISCHES FINANZDEPARTEMENT,
supra note 156, at 33; FIN. CONDUCTAUTH., supra note 152, §3.4; MONETARYAUTH. OF
SING., supra note 56, §6.2; FIN. SUPERVISORYCOMMISSIONCHINA (TAIWAN), supra note
41; Bank of Thailand Sandbox, supra note 136, § A.3. Bank Indonesia has not launched
the detailed regulatory sandbox. The FinTech office shall function as a unit tasked with
evaluating, assessing, and mitigating risk: Press Release, Bank Indon., supra note 133;
Press Release, Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, supra note 133 (stating that “[i]n terms of the
scope of the Fintech draft regulations, the OJK is preparing rules about capital, business
models, consumer protection and minimum risk management that Fintech companies
should satisfy”).
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 a company’s processes to protect clients, consumers,
counterparties, and the broader financial system.
Second, in terms of legal characteristics, regulators typically assess
whether there is a need for the sandbox, or whether the technology,
service or activity is already appropriately covered by existing law and
regulation.159 A positive assessment requires a finding that the provision
of the tech-based service faces an unnecessary regulatory burden.
Third, regulators require adequate preparation for the sandbox.160
Specifically, participants:
 need to have entered the development stage (and have left behind
the project stage) of the new solution;
 understand laws and regulations governing their conduct; and
 engage in appropriate risk management.
Once an entrant has been approved for participation, questions of
scope of coverage of the sandbox arise.
2. Scope
The scope of coverage of individual sandboxes varies considerably.
Sectorial Restrictions
While Australia, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Malaysia, and the
Netherlands do not limit the sandbox’s scope to certain sectors,161 the
Swiss and Hong Kong approach restricts it to authorized financial
159. See AUTHORITY FOR THE FIN. MKT. & DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, supra note
116, at 3–4; BANKNEGARAMALAY., supra note 56, § 5.1.e; FIN. CONDUCTAUTH., supra
note 152, § 3.4; MAURITIUS BD. OF INV., supra note 131, at 8.
160. See AUTHORITY FOR THE FIN. MKT. & DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, supra note
116, at 4; AUTORITI MONETARI BRUNEI DARUSSALEM, supra note 134, §10; BANK
NEGARAMALAY., supra note 56, § 5.1(b); FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 152, § 3.4;
MAURITIUS BD. OF INV., supra note 131, at 8–9; MONETARYAUTH. OF SING., supra note
56, §§ 6.2(d), 6.2(f); Letter from Howard Lee to Chief Exec., supra note 56.
161. Australian law instead limits the scope to testing of services providing financial
product advice in relation to eligible products and dealing in eligible products, see
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Cth), ASIC Corporations (Concept
Validation Licensing Exemption), 2016/1175, 15 Dec. 2016, s 5(1) (Austl.). See also
AUTHORITY FOR THE FIN. MKT. & DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, supra note 116, at 3;
AUTORITI MONETARI BRUNEI DARUSSALEM, supra note 134, at 5; BANK NEGARA
MALAY., supra note 56, § 2.1; MONETARYAUTH. OF SING., supra note 56, §4.
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institutions working with or without FinTech firms (with Swiss small
FinTech benefitting from a class waiver, infra V.E.1),162 while the Thai
sandbox approach is restricted to the scope of each of the two respective
Thai authorities that govern financial services, the Bank of Thailand for
banking and the Thailand Security and Exchange Commission for
securities and investments.163
For three reasons, this Article argues that sectoral restrictions
provide little help for both FinTechs and innovation, and should, if
possible, be removed. First, these restrictions entrench existing regulatory
borders, whereas FinTech often has the potential to abolish borders
altogether. In many cases, for example risk management, technology
initially developed for banks may be of greater use for insurance; hence,
allowing the expansion into InsurTech is crucial. Second, sectoral
restrictions are counter-productive to the sandbox’s objective in that they
reduce economies of scale and thus the value of an innovation. Third,
sectoral restrictions are superfluous. If a regulator seeks to gather
experience within one sector before allowing wider use in all sectors, it
may impose sectoral limitations on a case-by-case basis.
In some cases, a regulator-sponsored sandbox is limited to the
respective regulators’ jurisdiction, for instance in the Hong Kong example
(where the HKMA only has regulatory authority over banks and banking
activities). In such a case, the cooperation between the Dutch DNB and
AMF, which under the Dutch Twin Peaks model together supervise all
financial legislation, shows how regulators can address the issue in
practice.
162. With Swiss small FinTech benefitting from a class waiver, see infra Part IV.E.1.
The Swiss approach concerns deposits from the public (Publikumseinlage) which
licensed banks tend to hold, see EIDGENÖSSISCHESFINANZDEPARTEMENT, supra note 156,
at 2. The Hong Kong approach is available for authorized institutions which wish to try
out new technologies (banking services), see Letter from Howard Lee to Chief Exec.,
supra note 56.
163. See Dr. Veerathai Santiprabhob, Governor, Bank of Thai., Japanese Chamber of
Commerce Thailand Dinner Talk 6 (March 13, 2017) (transcript available at
https://www.bot.or.th/English/PressandSpeeches/Speeches/Gov/SpeechGov_13Mar201
7.pdf [https://perma.cc/KDB6-S6PK]); Press Release, Thailand SEC, http://www.sec.
or.th/th/Pages/News/Detail_News.aspx?tg=NEWS&lg=th&news_no=19&news_yy=25
60 [https://perma.cc/3QZQ-39N8].
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Existing Regulated Entities?
We observed some variety regarding the treatment of existing
regulated entities. While some regulators do not support licensed entities
in their innovative efforts,164 others do. For instance, while the HKMA
only opens participation to authorized institutions (though potentially in
conjunction with FinTech firms), 165 Australia, the United Kingdom,
Singapore, the Netherlands, and Mauritius,166 permit new firms to be
exempted or granted a restricted license, while authorized firms may
benefit from no-action letters,167 informal individual guidance on how to
read the law, and waivers from certain mandatory requirements.
Target Customers
There are often limits with regard to the customers the sandbox
participant is allowed to target. With the exception of the Australian class
waivers, these limits vest discretion in regulators. For instance, the
164. This is particularly true for the Australian, Brunei Darussalam and Swiss
sandbox approaches that open unregulated space for unregulated entities only. However,
the long-standing Australian practice of no-action letters for licensed entities may have
lessened the need for further leniency for these entities.
165. See Letter from Howard Lee to Chief Exec., supra note 56, at 1.
166. See ABU DHABI GLOB. MKT., supra note 155, at 13; AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS.
COMM’N, supra note 130, § RG 257.20; AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N,
REGULATORY GUIDE NO. 51: APPLICATIONS FOR RELIEF (Dec. 2009) §§ RG 51.67–.76,
http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1238972/rg51.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF2C-WZAB];
AUTHORITY FOR THE FIN. MKT. & DENEDERLANDSCHE BANK, supra note 116, at 5, 7–8;
AUTORITIMONETARIBRUNEIDARUSSALEM, supra note 134, § 5.1; FIN. CONDUCTAUTH.,
supra note 152, § 3.8, app.1; MAURITIUS BD. OF INV., supra note 131, at 8; MONETARY
AUTH. OF SING., supra note 56, § 2.3, annex.A.
167. Regulatory Sandbox, FIN. CONDUCTAUTHORITY, https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/
regulatory-sandbox (last visited June 27, 2016) (emphasis added) (“No enforcement
action letters: this letter would give firms some comfort that as long as they dealt with us
openly, kept to the agreed testing parameters and treated customers fairly, we accept that
unexpected issues may arise and we would not expect to take disciplinary action. We
would only use this tool for cases where we are not able to issue individual guidance or
waivers but we believe it is justified in light of the particular circumstances and
characteristics of different sandbox tests. The letter would only apply for the duration of
the sandbox test, only to our disciplinary action and will not seek to limit any liabilities
to consumers.We have not used this tool before, so we do not have examples of particular
circumstances where these letters may be appropriate.”).
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HKMA’s sandbox168 is open for services targeting “staff members or
focus groups of selected customers,”169 while MAS allows the applicant
to choose the type of customer,170 and the ASIC171 and the Mauritius
Investment Board172 deem services offered to retail and wholesale clients
eligible, in principle. This is, however, only one side of the story, as all
regulators retain the right to impose restrictions. The more that retail
clients comprise the focus of FinTech, the more restrictions regulators
will typically impose, even if they do not prevent sandbox access
altogether. This aspect is emphasized by the U.K. FCA which requires
that the “type of customers should be appropriate for the type of
innovation and the intended market, but also to the type of risks they are
exposed to,”173 while the Malaysian central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia,
may restrict “the participation of customers to a certain segment or profile
of customers” if warranted by the business model.174
The proportionality principle underlies the sandbox approach. If
wholesale clients are sufficiently sophisticated and skilled to understand
the risks they take,175 it may suffice if FinTechs serving those clients are
simply required to disclose their prenatal regulatory status. However,
FinTechs targeting retail clients must accept a higher degree of
regulation.176
The client type does not obviate systemic risk concerns, however,
and we may expect those concerns to be aired more often when FinTechs
target large, typically wholesale, clients. For instance, a FinTech
168. See Letter from Howard Lee to Chief Exec., supra note 56.
169. See id.
170. SeeMONETARYAUTH.OFSING., supra note 56, annex.B at 15. See alsoAUTORITI
MONETARIBRUNEIDARUSSALEM, supra note 134, §§ 1.3, 10.3.
171. See AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, supra note 130, §§ RG 257.82, 257.84.
172. MAURITIUSBD. OF INV., supra note 131, at 8–10.
173. See Default Standards for Sandbox Testing Parameters, FIN. CONDUCT
AUTHORITY (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/default-standards-
for-sandbox-testing-parameters.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LDF-9EPG] [hereinafter FCA
Default Standards].
174. See BANKNEGARAMALAY., supra note 56, § 6.3(c).
175. We take no position on the achievability of this proviso.
176. This case is made by Australian consumer protection activists. See Year Long
Holiday for Financial Firms Leaves Consumers At Risk, FIN. RTS. LEGALCTR. (Dec. 15,
2016), http://financialrights.org.au/year-long-holiday-for-financial-firms-leaves-consum
ers-at-risk/ [https://perma.cc/PQ24-3N2K].
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delivering an entirely new risk calculation to most of the banks which
together dominate a market could well give rise to systemic concerns.
Time and Size
The period a FinTech is allowed to play in the sandbox is typically
limited, either by a rule or on a case-by-case basis.177 Periods range, in the
first instance, from six months (United Kingdom, Brunei178), to twelve
months (Australia, Thailand, Malaysia 179 ), or twenty-four months
(Ontario, Abu Dhabi180). Generally, extensions are available.
The more certain the sandbox conditions, the more likely they will
suffice as a risk mitigating device, thereby reducing the importance of the
time limit. For instance, the Swiss sandbox proposal (Innovationsraum)
is not limited timewise. For as long as the FinTech remains below the
determined threshold of CHF1 million in deposits from the public, it will
not be subject to a licensing requirement. If the FinTech has between
CHF1 million and CHF100 million in deposits from the public, it will be
subject to a restricted license scheme with a lower regulatory burden that
follows the lines outlined above in Part III.181
Size and time limits, however, may not suit the specific risks and
opportunities. For instance, the above CHF100 million limit may be
appropriate for deposits, but would be extremely lenient for providers that
do not hold cash or assets on their balance sheet. Instead, we recommend
that regulators also impose other thresholds depending on the business
177. See AUTHORITY FOR THE FIN. MKT. & DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, supra note
116, at 5; MONETARYAUTH. OF SING., supra note 56, § 5.3. In addition, the HKMA seem
to practice a case-by-case assessment.
178. See AUTORITI MONETARI BRUNEI DARUSSALEM, supra note 134, app.B; FCA
Default Standards, supra note 173.
179. See Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Cth), ASIC
Corporations (Concept Validation Licensing Exemption), 2016/1175, 15 Dec. 2016, s
6(2) (Austl.); Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Cth), ASIC
Corporations (Concept Validation Licensing Exemption), 2016/1176, 14 Dec. 2016, s
6(2) (Austl.); AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, supra note 130, § RG 257.71; BANK
NEGARA MALAY., supra note 56, § 9.2; Bank of Thailand Sandbox, supra note 136, §
A.4; Thai SEC Sandbox, supra note 136, § A.
180. See Sec. Legislation of Ont. v. Angellist, LLC (2016), 39 O.S.C. Bull. 8903,
8903 (Can. Ont. Sec. Com.); ABUDHABIGLOB. MKT., supra note 155, at 10.
181. EIDGENÖSSISCHES FINANZDEPARTEMENT, supra note 156, at 18 (referring to the
modification of Article 6 II (a) of the Swiss Bank Ordinance).
76 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
model, for instance, number and type of clients, or data points
processed,182 which can then be paired with traditional measures such as
assets under management or deposit size.
3. Mandatory Provisions Subject to Waiver
Most sandbox rules do not specify which mandatory provisions may
be lifted, 183 but some regulators do disclose the minimum level of
compliance inside the sandbox. For instance, Singapore’s MAS 184 is
flexible with regard to its licensing fees, an entity’s capital requirements,
leadership requirements, credit rating, relative size, the organization of
the entity relating to supervisory standards of financial soundness, risk
management, and outsourcing. MAS rules, however, are strict on:
 confidentiality of customer information;
 management’s fitness (in particular honesty and integrity);
 handling of customers’ monies and assets by intermediaries; and
 anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing measures.
The OSC, 185 upon conditions that certain investors access only
certain services, has granted relief in respect of:
 audit requirement regarding financial statements;
 know-your-client requirements;
 suitability requirements;
 dispute resolution requirements;
 certain disclosure and reporting requirements; and
 the requirement to issue and distribute a prospectus.
The HKMA requirements that may be waived in the sandbox scheme
are “security-related requirements for electronic banking services, and the
timing of independent assessment prior to launching new technology
services.”186
182. Zetzsche et al., supra note 3 (manuscript at 33).
183. See BANKNEGARAMALAY., supra note 56, § 7.3(a); Bank of Thailand Sandbox,
supra note 136, § A.1 (FinTech products can be offered under “somewhat lenient rules”)
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 152, § 3.8; Letter from Howard Lee to Chief Exec.,
supra note 56, at 2 (concerning how HKMA does not want to provide “an exhaustive list
of the supervisory requirements that may potentially be relaxed”).
184. SeeMONETARYAUTH. OF SING., supra note 56, § 2.3, annex.A.
185. Angellist, LLC, 39 O.S.C. Bull. 8904, 8913–14.
186. Letter from Howard Lee to Chief Exec., supra note 56, at 2.
2017] REGULATING A REVOLUTION: FROM 77
REGULATORY SANDBOXES TO SMART REGULATION
The Dutch DNB/AMF commits “to make the best possible use of
any (legal) scope for the sandbox,” but acknowledges that not all
situations allow for sandbox arrangements.187 It notes that supervisors
have the most flexibility in terms of their own policies, some flexibility
with regard to interpreting national laws and rules, and virtually no
flexibility when it comes to interpreting and applying European-wide
laws and regulations. 188 Preferring instead to retain flexibility, most
authorities refrain from stipulating an exhaustive list of requirements that
may potentially be relaxed within the regulatory sandbox.
4. Removing the Privilege
Sandbox rules typically specify grounds upon which to withdraw the
privilege.189 Reasons for forced exit from the sandbox include:
 risks exceeding the benefits;
 non-compliance with laws or regulatory impositions; and
 the purpose of being in the sandbox not being achieved.
The first reason reflects the objectives of the sandbox. The regulatory
sandbox is made available as the regulator expects benefits to outweigh
risks. The privilege should be removed as soon as it is established that the
risks outweigh the benefits. Regulatory risks may come from the
FinTech’s conduct, so that non-compliance is a natural reason to
reconsider regulatory leniency. Likewise, if the regulator believes that
granting privileges has not furthered innovation, it should “pull the
privilege.” Finally, of course, firms should have the right to opt-out by
either shutting down the business or moving into the regulated sphere.
187. AUTHORITY FOR THE FIN. MKT. & DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, supra note 116,
at 6.
188. Id. at 6–7.
189. See ABU DHABI GLOB. MKT., supra note 155, at 10, 12; AUSTRALIAN SEC. &
INVS. COMM’N, supra note 130, § RG 257.54; AUTHORITY FOR THE FIN. MKT. & DE
NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, supra note 116, at 5; AUTORITI MONETARI BRUNEI
DARUSSALEM, supra note 134, § 9; BANK NEGARA MALAY., supra note 56, § 10.1;
MONETARYAUTH. OF SING., supra note 56, § 7.4.
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C. UPSIDES
1. Enhanced Communication
In a regulatory sandbox, regulators learn from the FinTech startups
due to their freedom to operate and communicate openly. This allows
entrepreneurs to freely discuss their concerns without fear for their license
conditions, and allows regulators to learn before major risks materialize
on the horizon. At the same time, within the sandbox, dispensation
efficiency is not curtailed by the anti-dispensation incentive on regulators
provided by liability. In particular, in the rare cases where the conditions
of the sandbox are specified clearly, entrepreneurs are assisted in arguing
for dispensations.
2. Kick-starting Innovation and Competition
A regulatory sandbox signals a regulator’s propensity to support
innovation. By limiting liability as a potential concern for regulators, the
sandbox promotes a balanced practice of dispensation, rather than one
focused on potential liability. The sandbox therefore may assist in
achieving an optimal level of openness for innovation, i.e. the level from
which societies benefit the most while limiting the risks.
These benefits are “internal” in that they promote innovation within
a financial ecosystem. However, a sandbox should also promote positive
external effects. First, it should incentivize traditional licensed entities to
accelerate their digital transformation. Second, it has already added to
the competition among financial centers as to which will become the
world’s pre-eminent FinTech hub. The sandbox as an institution
challenges reluctant regulators without sandboxes and pushes them to
publish, and possibly review, their dispensation policies.
While sandbox conditions could lead to a race-to-the-bottom style
competition, we contend that, on balance, the more likely outcomes from
sandboxes will be beneficial. If there is a very substantial lowering of
conditions—and some tendency in this direction can be observed as the
move for longer sandbox periods indicates—a reassessment of our view
in time may be warranted.
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3. Assessing Innovation… and Its Risks
While the sandbox concept itself is easy to copy (as the increasing
numbers of regulatory sandboxes around the world now demonstrate), its
true value lies in the substance of the sandbox, which is the extent to
which it can promote beneficial innovation based upon an in-depth
knowledge exchange between innovator and regulator.
In this regard, the sandbox signal is, generally speaking, less credible
for regulators with little experience in a given service area, as these
regulators have little insight into the risks they enable by adopting a
sandbox. Such regulators may either make promises of liberal treatment
they cannot live up to and need to renege upon later, or they may allow
unacceptable levels of risk to arise. Truly smart regulation will pair the
sandbox with a strong, fact-based, research-driven dispensation, and
licensing practice that furthers innovation while minimizing risk.
However, in markets where experienced regulators decide their cases,
regulated entities already enjoy, for the most part, the benefits of a
responsible dispensation practice, while avoiding the risks and uneven
competition a sandbox creates. Thus, it comes as no surprise that some
large and experienced regulators have hesitated to adopt the sandbox
approach and seek an efficient level of forbearance or dispensation by
way of no-action letters, restricted licensing, piloting, and other tools.
D. DOWNSIDES
1. Negative Signal to Market
Some downsides should be noted. Sandboxed activity is not fully
regulated. Risks for consumers and the financial system could
materialize. Clients, for this reason, may refrain from entering into
business with firms in the sandbox and this may slow the FinTech’s
growth. This is particularly true where regulation requires the outsourcing
provider to be regulated (including, for instance, portfolio management
and core banking functions such as deposit taking).
2. Lack of Standardization and Cost Reduction
In addition, the regulatory sandbox fails to capture both the
standardization and cost reduction functions of law. The latter is not a
concern as innovation will occur where technology reduces costs in the
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absence of the cost-reducing function of law. But the fact that the service
lacks the standardization associated with regulation makes the sandboxed
activity unfit for cross-border provision of services. This is particularly
true for smaller financial markets that lack, on a stand-alone-basis, the
market size necessary to exploit substantial economies of scale. In places
like Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Luxembourg, however, we see
significant financial innovation, given that financial and technological
skills combine with a shortage of inexpensive labor. For these
jurisdictions, a licensed sandbox umbrella190 could add to the benefits
provided by the regulatory sandbox.191
3. Lack of Transparency
Transparency in sandbox conditions can support regulated entities to
apply for dispensation on the same terms as unregulated entities, thereby
leveling the playing field between regulated and unregulated firms, and
assuring other jurisdictions that regulators are not concealing a race-to-
the-bottom within the sandbox.
Our comparative research suggests transparency is the issue with
perhaps the greatest room for improvement. A key principle of Smart
Regulation is that details of sandbox relief, as well as all innovation-
inspired relief orders for regulated entities, should be disclosed clearly
and swiftly on the regulator’s website. These disclosures will address the
level playing field concerns of regulated entities and competing financial
centers confronted with sandbox treatment as well as consumer and
systemic risk concerns. Further, over time, such disclosures will enhance
legal certainty.
4. Regulated versus Unregulated
In designing a regulatory sandbox, maintaining a level playing field
between regulated and unregulated entities is a core issue. Otherwise,
banks, insurers, and asset managers may suffer from a shortage of human
and financial capital and innovation. Regulators must strike a balance
190. See infra Part IV.E.3.
191. GREGOR DORFLEITNER & LARS HORNUF, BUNDESFINANZMINISTERIUM DER
FINANZEN, THE FINTECHMARKET INGERMANY 8 (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.bundesfin
anzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/International_affairs/Articles/20
16-12-13-study-fintech-market-in-germany.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
[https://perma.cc/Y3AG-PHQ8].
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between encouraging innovation and protecting clients and the financial
system. Regulated financial institutions must be supported to innovate
and put to use their advantageous data sets, expertise, and experience.
Existing institutions should enjoy the supervisory free space to support
the development of innovative products and services that is extended to
Fintech startups.
Regulation is a mere tool. Where helpful for society, it must be used,
where not it is best removed. Size and importance are not the only
characteristics that warrant regulation.192 For a defrauded individual, it
matters not whether the fraudsters managed $10 million or $10 billion of
assets.
Accordingly, technical innovation calls for regulatory innovation.
Regulators are well advised to pair a regulatory sandbox with an
appropriate approach to testing and piloting plus adequate dispensation
and no-action policies for regulated institutions. Sandbox rules should
enable licensed and unlicensed institutions to benefit equally if they seek
to develop innovative products or services and innovations such as the
sandbox umbrella should be open to both licensed and unlicensed entities.
E. OUT OF THEBOX THINKING: SANDBOXES ANDBEYOND
The above analysis suggests no single regulator has a monopoly on
the best framework for innovation, and regulatory sandboxes are not
always the best addition to their toolkits. A sandbox approach may
nevertheless be helpful in two respects. First, an official sandbox policy
with legislative endorsement reduces the risk of litigation for breach of a
regulator’s supervisory duties. The sandbox thus assists regulators in
achieving an efficient level of dispensation, enabling them to better weigh
benefits and downsides for society rather than solely for themselves.
Second, the sandbox signals a friendly regulatory view of innovation in
general, even in areas beyond the sandbox’s limits. Anticipating friendly
treatment “outside the box,” financial entrepreneurs and established
institutions may decide to locate their innovations and new jobs in these
jurisdictions. This will enhance the cluster development necessary for
innovation by providing a comparative advantage among competing
financial centers.
Our considerations so far highlight, however, that sandboxes are not
necessarily appropriate in all circumstances. While sandboxes are one
192. See Arner et al., supra note 2, at 1312–13.
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way to enhance communication between regulators and innovative firms,
other approaches of structured experimentation include class waivers,
piloting, and sandbox umbrellas.
1. Traditional Approach Cloaked as a Sandbox: Class Waivers for
FinTech Testing
The Australian approach is unique in granting a class waiver for
FinTech testing if certain eligibility criteria are met.193 ASIC ties its hands
to a greater extent than any other regulator, thereby providing a high
degree of regulatory certainty. As a general condition, the service or
product may not be offered to more than one hundred retail clients, while
the number of wholesale clients is not restricted. The test is limited to a
period of twelve months and a total customer exposure of AUD 5 million.
The testing firm must have adequate compensation arrangements for
losses (e.g., professional indemnity insurance) and dispute resolution
processes in place, and must meet predetermined disclosure and conduct
requirements.
The testing environment is limited to the provision of financial
advice and the dealing in or distribution of financial products194 and other
regulatory instruments.195 The Australian class waiver does not extend to
issuance of a product developed by the FinTech, the lending of money to
consumers, or the operation of a managed investment scheme (including
marketplace lending platforms).196 The class waiver also only extends to
eligible products, which are defined to include:
 Deposit products, with a maximum AUD 10,000 balance;
 Payment products, if issued by Authorized Deposit-taking
Institutions and with a maximum AUD 10,000 balance;
193. See Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Cth), ASIC
Corporations (Concept Validation Licensing Exemption), 2016/1175, 15 Dec. 2016, ss
5–7 (Austl.); Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Cth), ASIC
Corporations (Concept Validation Licensing Exemption), 2016/1176, 14 Dec. 2016, ss
5–7 (Austl.); AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, supra note 130, § RG 257.39.
194. As defined in Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)
s 12BAB.
195. See National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ss 7, 29 (Austl.);
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Cth), ASIC Corporations (Concept
Validation Licensing Exemption), 2016/1175, 15 Dec. 2016, s 5(1) (Austl.).
196. Cf. AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, supra note 130, §§ RG 257.56–
257.108).
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 General insurance, for personal property and home contents up to
AUD 50,000 insured;
 Liquid investments, for listed Australian securities or simple
schemes up to AUD 10,000 exposure; and
 Consumer credit contracts with certain features, and a loan size
between AUD 2,001 and AUD 25,000.
While the class waiver provides notable certainty, it creates limited
experimental space. Any successful FinTech operation will outgrow these
limits quite quickly, which raises the question of whether ASICmay grant
an additional sandbox arrangement beyond these limits or grant a
restricted license to class-waiver beneficiaries that exceeds the waiver
limits following a case-by-case assessment. So as to retain the pro-
competitive effects of the class-waiver, the law would be best applied in
this way.
A closer look reveals how different the class waiver is from a
regulatory sandbox. ASIC does not engage with innovative firms prior to
granting the privilege—the waiver is granted as a matter of law, rather
than upon application. Innovation is not a prerequisite, nor does a
knowledge exchange take place between privileged firms and ASIC. In
fact, the Australian class waiver is the traditional approach of specific
regulation cloaked in Fintech-friendly terminology. ASIC has moved in
this direction in part because of quite sensible doubts as to its expertise in
assessing a business model’s innovation. Similar approaches are likely to
be adopted in other countries where regulators have similar concerns.197
2. Testing and Piloting
The international popularity of sandboxes does not make these silver
bullet solutions. Indeed the OCC and SEC, the German BaFin, the
Luxembourg CSSF as well as both French regulators APRI and AMF
have declined to create regulatory sandboxes. Instead they favor granting
197. Notably, the Swiss regulatory sandbox proposal exhibits characteristics similar
to the Australian class waiver, exempting all banking business up to CHF 1 million in
deposits, without requiring notice or application to Swiss regulator FINMA, and easing
conditions for FinTech institutions up to CHF 100 million in deposits.
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leniency for testing and piloting. 198 Other regulators use extensive
piloting programs to substitute for a regulatory sandbox.199
An exemption for testing and piloting is particularly useful for
authorized financial institutions. They can test new technology and
business models without filing for regulatory approval. From a legal
perspective, we cannot say with certainty where testing and piloting ends
and regular activity begins. One definitional feature, however, is the
intention to continue a certain activity.200 A test lacks this feature, as it is
a one-time event, and whether the process is continued depends on the
outcome, which is entirely open. A pilot is a test where the organizational
and financial resources have been devoted to the continuance of business
and only some data for the decision are missing, which the pilot is
designed to provide.
Where the features of a definition of a regulated activity are met, it
cannot be justified on testing and piloting grounds, unless (1) the clients
are not selected on actual market criteria—we refer to this category as
“fake clients”; (2) the test participants are aware of their guineapig
function; (3) the use is limited to a certain number of occasions, a specific
time, or certain clients; and (4) the testing environment is insulated from
the licensed entities’ or FinTechs’ “real” business activity.
The former criteria are hard for regulators to establish. Where clients
consent, the FinTech could justify testing and piloting for some time. We
198. OFFICEOF THECOMPTROLLEROF THECURRENCY, OCCSUMMARYOFCOMMENTS
AND EXPLANATORY STATEMENT: SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR
FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 10 (Mar. 2017), https://www.occ.gov/topics/respo
nsible-innovation/summary-explanatory-statement-fintech-charters.pdf [https://perma.c
c/ZFE6-WF32]; BAFIN, supra note 112, at 40–41.
199. For instance, the Taiwanese Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) used to
run a FinTech Pilot Program that features many characteristics of a regulatory sandbox.
See Press Release, Fin. Supervisory Comm., 金融與科技攜手， 升級Fintech [jīn róng yǔ kē
jì xī shǒu shēng jí ] (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.fsc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=2&parentpath
=0&mcustomize=news_view.jsp&dataserno=201609090002&aplistdn=ou=news,ou=m
ultisite,ou=chinese,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtable=News [https://perma.cc/Z8MM-VQ
ZZ]. Now the country is implementing a regulatory sandbox through legislation. The
FSC-proposed FinTech Innovation Experimentation Bill is now being reviewed by the
country’s Legislative Yuan. For an overview and critique of the proposed sandbox
regime, see Jin-Lung Peng & Cheng-Yun Tsang, Reviewing and Redesigning the Post-
Experimentation Phase of Taiwan’s Financial Regulatory Sandbox Regime, 266 TAIWAN
L. REV. 35 (2017).
200. This requirement is the basis of various legal licensing tests, such as
professionalism, commercial activity, pursuing an activity as a business, and so on.
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thus speculate that there is an inherent connection between a regulatory
sandbox on the one side, and testing and piloting on the other. Those
jurisdictions with a sandbox approach put certain piloting and testing
activities inside the sandbox since this is more convenient for both the
FinTech and the regulators (with regulatory liability shielded and the
testing and piloting transparent). Meanwhile jurisdictions without a
regulatory sandbox are forced to implement a more generous approach to
testing and piloting, including often that “real” clients may substitute for
“fake” clients for limited periods.
3. The Sandbox Umbrella: Licensed Development Platforms
Rather than focusing on the regulated entity, as the regulatory
sandbox suggests, regulators could provide a specific testing environment
for activities which are—under the provisions of mandatory law—
regulated activities. For instance, the FCA has called for a “sandbox
umbrella,” run as a separate non-profit company authorized and
supervised by the regulator, which would allow unauthorized innovators
to operate under its aegis.201 The FCA has asked the market to set up the
“umbrella.”202 A similar development platform has also been discussed in
Luxembourg. For instance, a public sector body supported by all
stakeholder groups could assist in setting up a fully licensed development
platform, run in the public interest, so as to further innovation. We
hereafter refer to such a platform as a sandbox umbrella.
The sandbox umbrella is expected to respond and behave in all
respects as a regulated entity, but with the absence of a market-based
response (discontinuation) in case of failure. A sandbox umbrella could
be open for applications developed by unregulated and regulated entities.
Regulated entities could deliver services so as to test them under the
sandbox umbrella, or could acquire and test processes supplied by
unregulated FinTechs. The sandbox umbrella provides a trial
environment not available to the FinTechs inside the regulated entities or
otherwise.
201. FIN. CONDUCTAUTH., supra note 152, § 4.7.
202. Id. § 4.10.
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Opportunities
If many retail clients might be exposed to a new service, the sandbox
umbrella, rather than the (sandboxed) FinTech, could offer the service;
thus allowing for experiments with a greater number of clients under real
circumstances, and with better client protection than in the sandbox.
FinTechs that want to engage in real-time trials would not need their own
license but can use the umbrella’s license instead, following professional
informational technology due diligence provided by the sandbox umbrella
operator. Regulated entities willing to try an innovation do not need to
give access to their client data and systems. Rather, they can run FinTech-
based processes in the sandbox umbrella with dummy data generated
from supervisory metadata first and observe the effects in that enclosed
environment. Further, the sandbox umbrella would grant room to
experiment with regard to a regulated entity’s head office function, such
as compliance and risk management, where we expect many RegTech
solutions203 in years to come. In the absence of a sandbox umbrella, we
may see fewer entities try out these innovations—as who wants to
outsource crucial risk management and compliance functions to lowly
capitalized, unregulated firms?
The fact that the sandbox umbrella is fully compliant and risk
managed gives some assurance as to the stability of entities in it. At the
same time, the trial period could be set up (the sandbox umbrella already
holds the license), and would benefit from the cross-border availability
important for financial conglomerates and cross-border qualifications,
such as equivalence/substituted compliance and the European Passport.204
Close engagement with the regulator could ensure a speedy licensing
process if the FinTech seeks a license after having generated sufficient
clients to cover the additional costs. The sandbox umbrella would provide
an experimental space when multiple regulated competitors need to
cooperate to achieve the full benefits of innovation, such as in establishing
digital identity management and authentication systems, 205 settlement
203. Arner et al., supra note 4.
204. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
205. Stewart Bond, It was Only a Matter of Time—Digital Identity on Blockchain,
INT’L DATA CORP. (Mar. 29, 2009), https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-
bin/ssialias?htmlfid=GIL12346USEN [https://perma.cc/R9UK-DUBH]. See Blockchain
for Digital Identity, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/identity/ [https://perma.cc/T
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chains,206 or RegTech solutions207 (such as automated compliance, risk
management, and anti-money laundering, and client suitability checks)on
a blockchain. 208 The equal access of all innovators to the sandbox
umbrella could help in mutualizing the benefits.
Challenges
The challenges of the sandbox umbrella are obvious and serious.
First, liability does not vanish in a sandbox umbrella: it simply shifts from
the regulator to the umbrella operator as the party that needs to decide
which businesses are too risky to support. Second, financial centers would
need to focus on a handful of core activities for which a sandbox umbrella
S84-W7YP] (last visited Oct. 14, 2017); see also WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, A
BLUEPRINT FORDIGITAL IDENTITY—THEROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS INBUILDING
DIGITAL IDENTITY 60 (Aug. 2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Blueprint_f
or_Digital_Identity.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ2L-5CNG] (stressing the need for a more
secure digital identity system, relying on blockchain characteristics).
206. See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF BLOCKCHAIN: A
MULTISTAKEHOLDER APPROACH TO THE STEWARDSHIP OF BLOCKCHAIN AND
CRYPTOCURRENCIES 10 (June 2017), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Realizing_P
otential_Blockchain.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2VP-2X2Z]; Eva Micheler & Luke von der
Heyde, Holding, Clearing and Settling Securities Through Blockchain Technology
Creating an Efficient System by Empowering Asset Owners, 11 J. INT’LBANKING&FIN.
L. 652 (2016); Philipp Paech, Securities, Intermediation and the Blockchain—An
Inevitable Choice between Liquidity and Legal Certainty?, 21 UNIFORM L. REV. 612
(2016).
207. SeeWORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 205, at 92 (exploring the potential of
blockchain automated compliance).
208. Lewis Rinaudo Cohen & David Contreiras Tyler, Blockchain’s Three Capital
Markets Innovations Explained, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July–Aug. 2016; Trevor I. Kiviat,
Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKEL.J. 569 (2015–
16); Wessel Reijers et al., Governance in Blockchain Technologies & Social Contract
Theories, 1 LEDGER J. 134 REP 232 (2016); Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to
an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial
Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain
Technology the Future of Financial Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 232 (2016).
On blockchain technology, with a focus on law and governance, see Dirk A. Zetzsche et
al., The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, U. ILL.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017–2018).
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can be set up and effectively operate. 209 Third, there is regulatory
complexity: the set-up will require certain capital, substance and head
office functions. Responsibilities and risk openness must be designed and
carefully adjusted. To be sustainable the sandbox umbrella may require
support by leading experts, yet it is uncertain whether those experts will
be available for pro-bono engagement, or at all, due to conflicts or liability
risk. Fourth, financing and ongoing governance will be difficult with
multiple entities interested in gaining access. Finally, there is a limit to
the extent that a market will benefit from a sandbox umbrella. If the
sandbox umbrella enjoys privileges, newly-introduced business models
will need to be viable without those benefits, i.e. in the real market. If the
sandbox umbrella eats some of the lunch of licensed intermediaries it will
lose their support, but, without it, the success of the umbrella is less likely.
These difficulties may explain why we have not seen a publicly
sponsored sandbox umbrella working efficiently in the long-term, while
private entities’ incubator subsidiaries have taken on the role, albeit
without additional regulatory leniency.
4. A License for All: FinTech Licensing Schemes
Some FinTech licensing schemes are less than they appear. For
instance, the Mauritius FinTech License210 allows an entity to conduct an
innovative FinTech business “for which there are no, or no adequate
provisions under any enactment,” 211 i.e. existing financial law. Once
licensed, the entity can pursue its business as regulated entity. For the
license, however, applicants must file a regular application, including an
analysis of relevant laws at home and applicable licensing schemes
abroad, and meet regular licensing requirements once licensed, including
regular reports to the Mauritius Board of Investment. 212 Rather than
facilitating market entry by innovative firms the main function of this
FinTech License appears to be to fill gaps in the respective regulatory
environment.
209. For instance, Luxembourg would most likely focus on fund and depositary
operations, Germany on banks and insurance undertakings, the United Kingdom on
investment banks, and so on.
210. SeeMAURITIUS BD. OF INV., supra note 131, at 3.
211. Id. at 3.
212. Id. at 3–4.
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F. SOMEDATA… ANDWHAT THEY TELLUSABOUT THEREGULATORY
SANDBOX
1. Number of Sandboxed Entities
Only some regulators have disclosed their data. In many
jurisdictions, we can only speculate as to whether firms are using the
experimental space provided by the sandbox, and thus whether it is
helpful and needed.
The FCA announced in 2016, that twenty-four firms from sixty-nine
applications were authorized for the first cohort of the sandbox until July
2016.213 Eventually, eighteen firms formed this cohort starting FinTech
testing in November 2016.214 For the second cohort, the FCA reviewed
seventy-seven applications of which thirty-one met the eligibility criteria,
and twenty-four started testing in May 2017.215
The HKMA disclosed in February 2017 that “nine pilot trials of new
fintech solutions [had] been conducted by five banks using the Fintech
Supervisory Sandbox.”216 At the same time, the “Fintech Innovation Hub
has commenced operation and more than ten banks and [Stored Value
Facilities (SVF)] licensees have used the Hub.”217 This number has risen
to fourteen, as of March 2017.218
The Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) announced in May 2017
that its first batch of FinTech Reglab companies will comprise two United
213. See Regulatory Sandbox - Cohort 1, FIN. CONDUCTAUTHORITY (June 15, 2017),
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/cohort-1 [https://perma.cc/D9E9-D4
LH].
214. Id.
215. See Regulatory Sandbox - Cohort 2, FIN. CONDUCTAUTHORITY (June 15, 2017),
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/cohort-2 [https://perma.cc/BK5A-LH
P7].
216. H.K. MONETARY AUTH., BRIEFING TO THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PANEL ON
FINANCIALAFFAIRS 25 (Feb. 6, 2017).
217. Id.
218. Development of Financial Technologies 7 (H.K. Legislative Council Panel on
Fin. Affairs, LC Paper No. CB(1)777/16-17(03), 2017), http://www.legco.gov.hk/
yr16-17/english/panels/fa/papers/fa20170418cb1-777-3-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMQ8-
2EJU].
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Arab Emirates (UAE), two Indian, and one United States FinTech start-
ups.219
In Australia, in “April 2015, ASIC established an Innovation Hub to
help FinTech start-ups navigate the regulatory laws it administers on a
streamlined basis, including by providing informal guidance from senior
regulatory advisers.”220 In the financial year 2014–15, “ASIC approved
1,473 relief applications”221 as ASIC’s waiver powers allow it “to grant
relief from Australian Financial Service [AFS] licensing requirements,
provide exemptions from disclosure or reporting obligations, and issue
no-action letters.” 222 These high numbers for 2014–15 refer to relief
orders only. The ASIC sandbox opened in December 2016 and, we
believe, is yet to be particularly attractive to FinTechs. 223 This is
unsurprising given ASIC’s long standing and highly accepted practice of
relief orders, indicated by the above numbers, reduces the need for a
sandbox.
2. Implications
The little data disclosed suggests that so far sandboxes have been
used by very few firms, for which there could be several explanations.
First, as regulators bear large reputational and other risks for any firm in
their sandbox, they probably choose carefully before admitting firms.
Second, alternatives such as testing and piloting224 serve many of the
purposes of the sandbox. Third, few firms may qualify as genuinely
innovative so as to warrant sandbox treatment. Fourth, the sandbox may
be of little value for firms that intend to grow fast and have access to seed
financing. Such firms may quickly outgrow the sandbox, and the
sandbox’s downsides, including strict limits on size, activity and duration,
219. See Neil Ainger, Abu Dhabi Global Market Admits First Five Fintech Start-ups
Into Its Reglab Sandbox, CNBC (May 17, 2017, 11:27 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/201
7/05/17/abu-dhabi-global-market-admits-first-five-fintech-start-ups-into-its-reglab-
sandbox.html [https://perma.cc/XAP8-WLFY].
220. AUSTRALIANGOV’T, BACKINGAUSTRALIAN FINTECH 21 (2016), http://fintech.tr
easury.gov.au/files/2016/03/Fintech-March-2016-v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6T9-GW
YS].
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Press Release, The Honorable Scott Morrison MP, Treasurer of the
Commonwealth of Austl., (Dec. 15, 2016), http://sjm.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-
release/133-2016/ [https://perma.cc/MW5H-Z8BP].
224. See supra Part IV.E.2.
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may make it less attractive than applying for a restricted license or relief
order. This is particularly true as the restricted license may provide
enduring legal certainty for the supervised firm and fewer restrictions.
To date, the stringency of conditions imposed on regulatory sandbox
participants, and the seemingly low numbers of them, fail to explain
entrepreneurs’ enthusiasm for countries with sandboxes. The regulatory
sandbox alone, as presently structured, is typically too limited in scope
and scale to promote further meaningful innovation. In particular, the key
issue of FinTech entrepreneurs in the licensing process—their lack of
expertise as a main obstacle to the fit and proper person test, which
regulators apply to assess key people’s ability to run a licensed financial
intermediary—will not go away in the six to twelve months that the
FinTech operates in the sandbox. Prior to and after sandbox treatment,
most FinTech entrepreneurs need to bring experienced outsiders on board,
and share potential future profits with them, as a precondition to getting a
license.
For these reasons, a sandbox should be accompanied by an
appropriately designed system of forbearance, dispensation, and
restricted licensing, or other tools of smart regulation, such as a well-
designed piloting framework or sandbox umbrella, both of which are
considered in Part V.
V. TOWARD SMARTREGULATION
From this framework, the Article argues for a comprehensive review
of existing regulatory approaches in light of rebalanced objectives under
the rubric of smart regulation. This new automated and proportionate
regime would build on shared principles found in different jurisdictions
and support the potential of innovation in financial markets. In our view,
the fragmentation and de-homogenization of market participants and the
increased use of technology will require regulators to adopt a sequential
reform process, starting with digitization and then proceeding to build
digitally-smart regulation.
A. FROM SMALL-ENOUGH-TO-FAIL TO TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL: BUILDING A
REGULATORY STACK
An increasing number of regulators are beginning to experiment with
novel approaches, seeking to unlock innovative potential while
minimizing risks. There remain real questions as to the best model going
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forward. The above analysis shows how regulators have so far applied
various tools from their toolkit:
 Traditional approaches of regulating or not regulating;225
 Cautious experimentation through forbearance, special charters,
or restricted licenses;226 and
 Structured, transparent experimentation through regulatory
sandboxes or piloting.227
Each of these adjusts the “competition dial” by seeking to generate
innovation while preserving consumer protection and market stability.
However, the evolution of FinTech in the last decade has pushed
regulators to continually readjust their methodology towards supervision
and licensing. This iterative process has gradually increased regulators’
sophistication in their understanding of FinTech innovations and business
models. While it is a positive sign that regulators are progressively
accepting competitive innovation, each of the tools previously discussed
in Parts I to Part V lack the ambition of developing a new regulatory
paradigm.
B. MUTUAL LEARNING
In the meantime, a positive, forward-looking regulatory momentum
is building, in contrast to the pattern of the previous ten years. Regulators
in global financial centers have increasingly realized the potential benefits
of FinTech for consumers, RegTech for themselves, and the potentially
harmful impact of excessive post-Crisis regulatory stringency. Over time,
market participants are able to identify the signs of regulatory interest in
promoting innovation. These messages are typically first conveyed by
regulators establishing FinTech contact points228 or appointing FinTech
officers.229 This is then often followed by the regulator initiating market
225. See supra Part II.
226. See supra Part III.
227. See supra Part IV.
228. Welcome to the FinTech Contact Point, SEC. & FUTURES COMMISSION,
http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/sfc-fintech-contact-point/ [https://perma.cc/GNY6-MBWN]
(last updated Sept. 29, 2017).
229. Angela Tan, MAS Appoints ex-Citi Banker to Head New FinTech Innovation
Group from Aug, BUS. TIMES (July 27, 2015, 2:27 PM), http://www.businesstimes.com.
sg/banking-finance/mas-appoints-ex-citi-banker-to-head-new-fintech-innovation-group-
from-aug [https://perma.cc/Q5PH-CRYR].
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meetings, discussions and consultations, 230 and then sometimes
establishing a sandbox. Indeed, the major contribution of a sandbox from
a regulator’s perspective may lie, not in the substance of what is often a
highly restrictive safe space, but in its signaling function: communicating
regulator flexibility towards innovative enterprises, and regulator desire
to understand new technologies. Many regulators now understand that
their doors need to stay open to facilitate knowledge transfer in an era of
rapid technological change.
C. REGTECH
In addition to the challenges of regulating FinTech, technology is
playing an ever-increasing role in financial regulation itself. This ever-
growing use of technology in finance is gradually putting pressure on
regulators to move from regulations designed to control human behavior
to regulation that seeks to supervise automated processes.231 In other
words, FinTech’s growth has elicited the need for RegTech,232 the need
to use technology, particularly information technology, in the context of
regulation, monitoring, reporting, and compliance.233
RegTech not only offers financial institutions the potential for
massive cost savings in meeting their compliance obligations, but more
importantly offers the opportunity for regulators to perform their
functions more effectively in close to real time.234 The combination of
FinTech and RegTech offers the potential for the development of a very
different financial system from that which exists today.
230. ASIC Consults on a Regulatory Sandbox Licensing Exemption, AUSTL. SEC. &
INV. COMMISSION (June 8, 2016), http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-
media-release/2016-releases/16-185mr-asic-consults-on-a-regulatory-sandbox-
licensing-exemption [https://perma.cc/DJM8-WMFW].
231. See generallyDELOITTE&AEGIS, OPPORTUNITIES INTELECOM SECTOR: ARISING
FROMBIGDATA (Nov. 2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/in/Docu
ments/technology-media-telecommunications/in-tmt-opportunities-in-telecom-sector-
noexp.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX2T-G5WU].
232. INST.OF INT’LFIN., REGTECH INFINANCIALSERVICES: TECHNOLOGYSOLUTIONS
FORCOMPLIANCEANDREPORTING 5–8 (Mar. 2016), https://www.iif.com/system/files/reg
tech_in_financial_services_-_solutions_for_compliance_and_reporting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ZA6-25LN].
233. See Arner et al., supra note 2.
234. Id. at 1317.
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D. PROPORTIONALITY ANDREGULATORYREFORM
Implementing a regulatory sandbox does not substitute for otherwise
warranted regulatory reforms. In particular, the abolition of some Crisis-
driven rules should be discussed openly as regulators and politicians may
have overreacted to the crisis, and adopted, at least some, unwise rules.235
Crisis-inspired rules should not become a dogma. Legislators and
regulators should be open for reforms where regulation is a hindrance,
and deregulation creates little, if any, added risk.236
Even when the rationale of existing financial law is sound,
mushrooming implementation rules or outdated traditions can lessen the
openness for innovation. The post-Crisis wave of regulation has left little
conduct unregulated, so regulators should reconsider whether and how
they can reduce the burden of regulation while leaving essential
protections intact. For instance, if regulators favor detailed regulation for
Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) financial institutions, this can
reduce the openness for innovation where it is most needed. Regulations
may need to be drafted with a light, responsive touch, as the ability to
adapt in a disruptive environment is a recipe for survival. Proportionality
in drafting and applying financial legislation237 is of utmost importance—
and this is the direction in which the regulatory sandbox and the other
tools of Smart Regulation lead regulators and regulation.
E. ELEMENTS OF SMARTREGULATION
The increasing commoditization of core technologies such as
machine learning and artificial intelligence is opening a Pandora’s box of
new FinTech and RegTech solutions.
235. See e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate
Governance Round II, 95MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011); Luca Enriques &Dirk A. Zetzsche,
Quack Corporate Governance, Round III? Bank Board Regulation Under the New
European Capital Requirement Directive, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 211 (2015);
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
236. We do not express a view on whether abolition of the Volcker Rule meets that
test.
237. On the divergent meaning of proportionality across jurisdictions, see ANAPAULA
CASTRO CARVALHO ET AL., FIN. STABILITY INST., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
PROPORTIONALITY IN BANKING REGULATION: A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON (Aug.
2017), https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights1.pdf [https://perma.cc/P386-4QR3].
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In designing tomorrow’s financial regulation three major market
trends need to be considered. First, FinTech innovation is increasingly
happening in diverging geographical clusters away from the traditional
birthplaces of tech innovation such as Silicon Valley. This means that the
monitoring of new technologies, or emerging risks as regulators may call
them, is increasingly difficult. As a perspective, over 100 million start-
ups are established each year238 representing both a logistical challenge
for discovery and monitoring and the best avenue for future growth.
Second, the role of technology is increasing as demonstrated in the rapid
growth of FinTech and RegTech businesses since 2016. 239 The self-
learning nature of algorithms is rapidly transforming the scope and
potential for automated regulation.240 Third, the increasing amount of data
in the world241 is fueling all tech industries, including RegTech, FinTech,
and TechFin. The potential actionable insights derived from data
processing often extend beyond our current imagination but are also
associated with emerging risks.242
Fundamental to the future of FinTech is the regulatory context in
which it operates. Innovation requires smart regulation. We see three
elements that form the basis of such a smart regulatory framework.
238. How Many Startups Are There in the World? (Infographic), INNMIND.COM
(Sept. 15, 2016), http://innmind.com/articles/262 [https://perma.cc/AC5T-DMLK].
239. Lawrence Wintermeyer, Global FinTech VC Investments Soars in 2016, FORBES
(Feb. 17, 2017, 7:07 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lawrencewintermeyer/2017/02/
17/global-fintech-vc-investment-soars-in-2016/#527d936f2630 [https://perma.cc/22PM
-BYP4];US$656M Invested in Australia’s FinTech Sector 2016, KPMG (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://home.kpmg.com/au/en/home/media/press-releases/2017/02/fintech-pulse-q4-201
6-23-feb-2017.html [https://perma.cc/49WT-9T2T].
240. See Dave Gerschgorn, We Don’t Understand How AI Make Most Decisions, So
Now Algorithms Explaining Themselves, QUARTZ (Dec. 20, 2016), https://qz.com/86535
7/we-dont-understand-how-ai-make-most-decisions-so-now-algorithms-are-explaining-
themselves/ [https://perma.cc/6DHH-QJJP].
241. See Jack Loechner, 90% of Today’s Data Created in Two Year, MEDIAPOST
(Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/291358/90-of-todays-
data-created-in-two-years.html [https://perma.cc/G2BQ-FKAN].
242. For a first assessment, see Zetzsche et al., supra note 3. For an outline of
systematic risks, see Elaine Ou, Can’t Stream Netflix: The Cloud May Be to Blame,
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Mar. 2, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles
/2017-03-02/can-t-stream-netflix-the-cloud-may-be-to-blame [https://perma.cc/EUP8-B
2AG].
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1. Focus on (Risk) Fundamentals
First, the new automated and proportionate “smart” regime should
be built on shared fundamentals of financial regulation. As an example,
while all regulators agree on the importance of combatting money
laundering and financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) and international
bodies are set up to ensure minimum standards set by the Financial Action
Task Force,243 implementation of these recommendations varies among
countries which renders problematic the efficient international
coordination of AML/CFT rules.244 Lack of innovation in this area may
be the result of insufficient harmonization245 or regulatory stringency. To
resolve this tension, regulators will need to focus on their broader
mandates as defined by applicable legislation (i.e. consumer protection,
financial stability, competition and prudential regulation) as opposed to
attempting to apply overly rules-based approaches which will inevitably
trail the velocity of innovation and overly stretch regulatory resources. In
other words, being “technologically neutral” should not be used as an
argument that excuses regulators from the need to understand the impact
of new technologies on processes (e.g. biometric identification for
payments) or business models (e.g. alternative data credit scoring).
Instead “technological neutrality” should mean that regulators do not seek
to “regulate” technological innovations, but instead focus on the financial
processes and activities that technology enables and that ought to be
subject to regulation (e.g. it is not automated investment advice that is the
problem, but the risk of fraud or improper advice).246
2. Towards Lower Entry Barriers
Second, we believe the key is not the regulation of innovative
processes and activities, but instead the regulation of competition in
243. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBININGMONEY
LAUNDERINGANDTHEFINANCINGOFTERRORISM&PROLIFERATION (updated June 2017),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Reco
mmendations%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AF9-TJKR].
244. Caroline Binham, Anti-Money Laundering Rules Need to Be Toughened Up,
Warns FSB, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/99d0f7f7-a9cb-
3096-99d6-1c4469f45fca [https://perma.cc/H99V-5XY7].
245. See INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 232.
246. See Arner et al., supra note 2, at 1307–08.
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financial markets. Defining the boundaries of competition and innovation
is a challenge for regulators.247 Regulatory sandboxes are an example of
innovation in financial regulation in the context of seeking to balance
these competing objectives. Of course, a close look reveals that both are
two sides of the same coin: innovation enables competition, and
competition drives innovation in that one competitor seeks to distinguish
itself from the others. So competition on the merits (i.e. where all
participants follow the same rules and bear the same costs) is, generally
speaking, a good thing for financial markets. In the context of FinTechs,
however, it is difficult to determine whether a new entrant is a competitor
or collaborator.248 Some FinTechs may follow disruptive strategies, while
others support licensed entities in mastering the digital revolution. Both
approaches are healthy and support the financial ecosystem. On balance,
at least for jurisdictions that wish to compete by signaling regulatory
flexibility to the market, the express provision of the promotion of
innovation in their mandate could be most useful.
In addition, the fact that competition spurs the arrival of new
participants is facilitating regulatory capacity to experiment with new
supervisory and reporting models. The bargaining power of start-ups with
regulators is disproportionality low compared to that of large incumbent
licensed enterprises. In practice, this provides regulators with the
opportunity to engage in a sequenced reform process. On the one hand,
incumbent financial institutions and supervised entities will have
increasingly to face digitized monitoring and reporting. On the other
hand, new market participants may try digital regulation from the onset.
This allows experimentation at the margin (as supported by the low
numbers of firms in sandboxes) while the bulk of the industry is gradually
brought to new standards via the digitization of regulatory requirements
themselves, in short: RegTech. Risks incurred by unregulated, yet
sandboxed, firms may be accepted—for the very reason that they can
kickstart innovation while traditional regulation sets higher-than-desired
barriers to innovation.
All in all we argue for the development of a Smart Regulatory
approach that seeks to lower the entry barriers to financial markets for
247. See source cited supra note 2.
248. See ACCENTURE, FINTECH AND THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE: LANDING POINTS
FOR THE INDUSTRY 5–6 (2016), https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-fintech-
evolving-landscape (follow “Download”) [https://perma.cc/ES4Z-9BVJ] (arguing that
FinTechs are either disruptors or collaborators).
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both FinTech, RegTech and TechFin, while keeping the sentries at the
entry gates.
3. Four Stages of Smart Regulation
From this basis, a reasonable regulatory approach could comprise
four sequenced stages:
(1) A testing and piloting environment.
(2) A regulatory sandbox, which widens the scope of testing and
piloting, is transparent, and removes the regulators’ disincentive
to grant dispensations (and depending on the ecosystem and the
importance of cross-border recognition the sandbox may take the
form of a sandbox umbrella).
(3) A restricted licensing / special charter scheme, under which
innovative firms can further develop their client base and
financial and operational resources.
(4) When size and income permits, the move to operating under a full
license.
From one stage to the next, regulatory complexity and fixed costs of
regulation increase, as does the FinTech’s operational space in terms of
clients, resources, and scope. This should lead to a desirable lowering of
the entry barriers to financial markets. Figure 1 shows the resulting four
stages of Smart Regulation.
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Figure 1: The Progressive Approach of Smart Regulation
With every stage, the Smart Regulator considers risk considerations
bearing in mind the firm’s ability to cover costs, and seeking to maintain
a similar regulatory burden for licensed entities.
Figure 2 outlines the correlation between “openness to innovation”
and “risk consideration.”
Figure 2: Relationship of Firm Size and Regulatory Priorities
We note that in Figure 2, “small” and “large” are indicators referring
to firm development and maturity, as measured by a combination of
organization and financial resources, and income and client base. In a
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FinTech environment, one factor alone is insufficient to signal the firm’s
maturity and readiness to progress to the next stage.
CONCLUSION
This Article highlights how financial regulation must seek to balance
the competing objectives of promoting innovation, financial stability, and
consumer protection. This is a particular challenge ten years after the
Crisis, which prompted a massive refocusing of regulatory attention on
financial stability and consumer protection. Yet, nonetheless, the great
promise of FinTech has begun to alter regulatory attitudes and
approaches.
An increasing number of jurisdictions are considering how to best
balance support for FinTech with the major objectives of financial
stability and consumer protection. Some jurisdictions have done nothing;
the consequence of which spans from being laissez-faire—like in the case
of China prior to mid-2015—to being very restrictive in jurisdictions
which require new entrants and activities to comply fully with existing
regulation. Others, on a case-by-case basis, relax existing rules for
FinTech, while yet others are developing more structured sandbox
approaches or other more comprehensive efforts to develop regulatory
systems appropriate to FinTech.
Regulatory texts about regulatory sandboxes are often characterized
by a certain level of unclarity. The unclarity can thwart a FinTech’s claim
for admission to the sandbox, reflect regulator’s rule of law and risk
control concerns, and make the substance of the regulatory sandbox
harder to define. The fuzziness brings about not only rule of law concerns,
but also puts regulated entities in an uncomfortable position: as they do
not know the conditions under which their competitors operate. The
success of a regulatory sandbox is hard to measure. Small numbers can
indicate careful selection by regulators of sandbox participants, or the lack
of a need for, or interest in, this innovation. This is particularly true since
the sandbox, in many cases, does not go further than the exemptions and
no-action letters granted under the traditional restricted licensing regime.
The stricter the regulation in the pre-sandbox state, the greater the
need for the tools this Article refers to as smart regulation and the greater
the potential of a regulatory sandbox. In fact, the regulatory sandbox is
one way to achieve proportionality of regulation where abolishing or
amending rules is not politically feasible.
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When the conditions imposed on sandbox beneficiaries are too
stringent, the sandbox may fail to promote meaningful innovation.
Certainly, the regulatory sandbox should be open enough to create a level
playing field between licensed and unlicensed innovators. For these
reasons, a sandbox should be accompanied by other tools of smart
regulation, in particular no-action letters, restricted licensing, and special
charter policy provisions.
A sandbox approach may be particularly helpful in three respects.
First, an official sandbox policy with legislative endorsement reduces the
risk of litigation for breach of a regulator’s supervisory duties. The
sandbox assists regulators, whose hands are tied by the rule of law, in
achieving an efficient level of dispensation. It allows regulators to weigh
the benefits and downsides for society rather than acting primarily in their
own interest. The regulatory sandbox may remove regulators’
disincentive to set aside certain rules, thereby furthering an optimal level
of dispensation. Second, a regulatory sandbox often facilitates a level of
knowledge exchange in both directions that goes well beyond the level of
information supervised entities typically like to share with their regulator.
This encompasses knowledge that may assist regulators to enforce
existing rules more efficiently, or design better rules. Third, the regulatory
sandbox may signal to innovative businesses a friendly general
regulatory approach to innovation. Anticipating friendly treatment
“outside the (sand)box,” financial entrepreneurs and established
institutions may decide to locate their innovation (and new jobs) in
countries that have communicated their openness to innovation in this
way. This signaling function may explain entrepreneurs’ enthusiasm for
countries with a regulatory sandbox, even when the actual rules of the
sandbox are very strict, or do not, in substance, go beyond existing
dispensation practices. The co-location of businesses inspired by these
sandbox signals can add to the cluster development necessary for speedy
innovation, thereby providing a comparative advantage in competition
among financial centers.
For the same reason, we see regulators seeking to open markets for
their firms by entering into supervisory agreements with other innovation-
friendly regulators. 249 This is regardless of equivalent regulation and
249. See British and Australian Financial Regulators Sign Agreement to Support
Innovative Businesses, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMMISSION (Mar. 23, 2016),
http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2016-releases/16-088m
102 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
supervision of sandboxed entities as a standard precondition for cross-
border recognition of the entity’s regulatory status not being usual.
While the sandbox signal itself is easy to copy (as more than a dozen
regulatory sandboxes today demonstrate), its strength lies in the substance
of the sandbox, and its ability to support beneficial innovation. In this
regard, the sandbox signal is, generally speaking, less credible for
regulators with less expertise. These regulators may either make promises
they cannot keep, or allow an irresponsible degree of risk to arise. True
Smart Regulation pairs the sandbox with a strong, fact-based, research
driven piloting, and restricted licensing practice that grants proportionate
regulation to innovative firms in each of their development stages while
keeping risks at an adequate, although not minimum, level.
How this happy state can be achieved for each and every financial
business model is, as of now, uncertain. To a large extent, not only the
FinTech, but also the regulator, plays in the sandbox. We may accept this
as a necessity created by the combination of overbearing post-Crisis
regulation and immensely rapid technological change. However, that
FinTechs and regulators together play with individuals’, and the broader
social, well-being leaves us with a certain uneasiness. This may be cured
by transparency of the practices within sandboxes and dispensation
practices coupled to close scrutiny and guidance by legislators and
regulators. This uneasiness may also explain why some large and
experienced regulators, such as those of the United States, Germany,
France, and Luxembourg, grant sandbox-like benefits in the form of no-
action letters, special charters, and restricted licensing practices, but have
not adopted a regulatory sandbox.
Finally, we note that regulatory flexibility cannot substitute for
demand. In the absence of market demand (for whatever reason) a
r-british-and-australian-financial-regulators-sign-agreement-to-support-innovative-busi
nesses/ [https://perma.cc/9HYV-G8F4] (stating that “[a]s a result of the agreement signed
today, the [U.K. FCA] and the [ASIC] will refer to one another those innovative
businesses seeking to enter the others’ market. The regulators will provide support to
innovative businesses before, during and after authorisation to help reduce regulatory
uncertainty and time to market. The agreement follows the creation of Innovation Hubs
at the FCA and ASIC in October 2014 and April 2015, respectively. The Hubs were set
up to help businesses with innovative ideas navigate financial regulation, support them
through the authorisation process and engage with the regulator. To date the FCA’s
Innovation Hub has supported over 200 businesses and the authorisation of 18 businesses.
Likewise, ASIC has dealt with over 75 innovative start-ups including the granting of 10
licences.”).
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regulatory sandbox will not assist. Sandboxes cannot substitute for a
sound business model. Sandboxes can only function properly where a
solid foundation of financial and technical expertise meets regulatory
openness and market demand.
As this Article demonstrates, the tools of innovation-supportive
Smart Regulation include (1) deregulation / non-regulation, (2) restricted
licensing / special charters, (3) leniency for testing and piloting, (4)
regulatory sandboxes, and (5) sandbox umbrellas. A regulatory sandbox
and traditional restricted licensing differ, for the most part, in terms of the
official policy approach, and marketing. Where regulators are deeply
experienced, their expertise can facilitate a pro-innovative approach even
in the absence of a regulatory sandbox. As for testing and piloting,
conduct previously treated in a generous manner may today find itself in
the regulatory sandbox, given that the sandbox creates advantages for
FinTechs and regulators alike.
Going forward, regulatory sandboxes are but one early step in a
process that will over time embrace new smart—digitized and datafied—
regulatory systems.
